ABSTRACT
Intellectual Humility as it Pertains to Self-Knowledge
Nicholas S. Grounds

Virtue epistemologists affirm that both faculties and intellectual character traits play
primary roles in epistemology.

However, virtue epistemology has little to say about self-

knowledge and the intellectual virtues. Intellectual humility is now widely considered to be an
epistemic trait, and over the past decade many different accounts of it have been offered. This
fresh epistemic perspective on humility provides an excellent framework by which to examine the
relationship between humility and self-knowledge, because intellectually humble dispositions help
bypass obstacles to self-knowledge (e.g. The Limitations-owning account and the Low-concern
account).

There are two notable obstacles to substantial self-knowledge: fantastical self-

conception and blameworthy self-ignorance. Given these problems, substantial self-knowledge
requires critical and honest self-reflection, and therefore intellectual humility is necessary for
substantial self-knowledge because it plays an integral role in forms of critical self-reflection.
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Introduction
The virtue of humility has historically been defined as a kind of other centeredness,
which means that the humble person values others above oneself.1 This common account of
humility reveals its Christian origins, especially when considering that the Greeks were not
particularly fond of humility. It is widely accepted that Aristotle viewed humility as equivalent
with the vice of pusillanimity, whereby the pusillanimous person does not have adequate selfknowledge given that one deprives oneself of the honors that one is due.2 Challenging Aristotle
on this, Thomas Aquinas insisted that the virtue of humility rightfully restrains the appetite from
aiming at magnanimous things that one does not deserve.3 In this sense, humility is akin to the
virtue of magnanimity, just as its primary function is in the business of appetite management.
Aquinas viewed humility as a moral virtue that requires self-knowledge, but even though the
humble person needs to have self-knowledge in order to manage the appetite, he insisted that
humility is not an epistemic virtue.4 The simple question is: Was Aquinas right to suggest this?
Over the past decade there has a been a surge of research and literature devoted to the
epistemic dimensions of the virtue of humility. To be sure, intellectual humility is now widely
considered to be an intellectual virtue by many ethicists and epistemologists. While intellectual
humility has gained plenty of attention for its benefits for general epistemic concerns, one of the
questions that is yet to be tackled with the vivacity it deserves is the relationship between
intellectual humility and self-knowledge. What is more, the relationship between self1

A good work on this specific account of moral humility is Lisa Fullam’s The Virtue of Humility: a Thomistic
Apologetic. See bibliography.
2
Aristotle, & Irwin, T. (n.d.). Nicomachean ethics / Aristotle; translated by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Pub., c1985. Book IV, Chapter 3 §3 and §8
3
Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican
Province. Second and revised edition, 1920. http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3161.htm (accessed April 15,
2019) II.II, q. 161, a. 1, obj.3 & ad 3
4
Ibid, ST II.II, q. 161, a.2, ad. 1
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knowledge and the intellectual virtues in general needs more attention. Given that Aristotle and
Aquinas shared the common understanding that humility is concerned with one’s selfconception, now that humility is considered an epistemic virtue it only seems fitting that its most
basic application would be for self-knowledge.
Beyond Aristotle and Aquinas, philosophers by the likes of Augustine, Immanuel Kant,
and Søren Kierkegaard have all emphasized the connection between humility and selfknowledge. Augustine more or less tuned the Greek proverb gnothi seauton (know thyself) to fit
his theological schema, just as he insisted that to know God is the means by which one comes to
know thyself. Augustine operated under the tacit understanding that humility and selfknowledge are intimately connected. In the City of God Augustine affiliates each of the two
cities with the virtue/vice spectrum of humility and pride.5 Humility is an attitude of
subservience that is rooted in a love for God and his commandments to value others above
oneself (other-centeredness); this humble love is manifested through the four cardinal virtues of
temperance, prudence, bravery, and justice.6 Contrary to this, Augustine viewed pride as being
rooted in a deep love of self, and this love finds expression in the manifold of self-indulgent
vices.
Keeping with the Greek spirit, Immanuel Kant suggested that the first and greatest duty
of the self is to know thyself, because to descend into the human heart—as unbecoming as it may
be—is the only means by which one can obtain true wisdom.7 Kant suggested that infallible
self-knowledge is not possible because of the many psychological and epistemological hurtles

5

Augustine. The City of God. New York: Image Books, 2014. Book XIV, Chapter 13; or see page 296.
Augustine. Chapter 15 in The Writings Against the Manichaeans and Against the Donatists.
https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf104.iv.iv.xvii.html (accessed April 14, 2020)
7
Ibid.
6

2

that obstruct it.8 But even in the face of the various challenges to self-knowledge, Kant viewed
self-knowledge as necessary for the virtuous life.9 Jeanine Grenberg notes that Kant made a key
distinction between substantial self-knowledge and derivative self-knowledge. Substantial selfknowledge is knowledge of the universalities of human nature; it is knowledge that all humans
are capable of good, while also corrupt and imperfect.10 Derivative self-knowledge for Kant is
self-knowledge that is particular to individual agents, such as one’s own motivations or
character.11
In order to obtain derivative self-knowledge, Kant advocates for a kind of evidentialism
or behaviorism, where the agent reflects on one’s own self-concept, and then examines one’s
behavior in order to see if one’s actions are consistent with one’s self-conception.12 But because
derivative self-knowledge is limited by human imperfection and corruption, failure to obtain
self-knowledge is inevitable at times. Kant suggested that substantial knowledge of human
nature is a requisite quality of humble attitudes; this allows the humble person to press on
towards derivative self-knowledge with a confidence to fulfill one’s obligation to know thyself,
even though this fundamental duty is incredibly challenging to uphold.13 What is more, because
substantial self-knowledge reveals the universal human condition of corruption and dependence,

8

Grenberg, Jeanine. Kant and the Ethics of Humility. Cambridge University Press, 2005. Page 223.
Ibid, page 224
10
Ibid
11
Ibid, page 226. Kant did not view substantial knowledge as a direct knowledge of human substance or essence.
This would be inconsistent with his metaphysics. Grenberg argues that Kant’s account of virtue has more to do with
the internalizing of certain values and principles, and this is what dispositions are connected with. Because Kant
affirms that humans are corrupt, essential human nature is not excellent, and therefore requires the internalization of
moral principles. The duty to know thyself derivatively is done with a humble attitude only when one recognizes
that one is by nature prone to wicked self-conception. See Grenberg, Chapter 2: “Constraints on any possible
Kantian account of virtue.”
12
Ibid
13
Ibid, page 228
9
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Kant viewed humble attitudes as the means by which beneficence or other centeredness is
realized.14
Following in Kant’s footsteps, Kierkegaard insisted that the process of internalizing
ethical duties is the vehicle by which humans realize a more authentic self; a synthetic self that
emerges when there is equilibrium between the aesthetic and the ethical modes of being; an
equilibrium between the particular and universal capacities of humanness. But this process of
coming to know oneself necessitates a choice, the choice of choosing the real self, the limited
self, and not the manifold of idealistic selves that merely exist in abstract fantasy. Becoming an
authentic individual requires both responsibility and self-knowledge, whereby Kierkegaard
places emphasis on the act of choosing the real self as a kind of ethics for self-inquiry. While
substantial self-knowledge begins in equilibrium between the aesthetic self and the ethical self,
Kierkegaard suggests that there is a deeper tension within one’s soul that depends on God.
Ironically, and with a bit of humor, he suggests that to know oneself is to know that one is not
capable of anything at all, because one is ultimately dependent on God for everything. When
viewed through the lens of Kant’s understanding of humility, Kierkegaard seems to imply that
humility is needed to admit one’s limitations, but a deeper application of humility reveals that
one’s soul is ultimately dependent on God.15

14

See Grenberg Chapter 9: “The humble pursuit of respect for persons.” Because the humble person will understand
one’s own dependency on others, Grenberg argues that humility is the lens by which one realizes one’s own
dependency on others, and recognizes that everyone is in the same boat. Humility involves recognizing the value
and needs of others, and therefore one has an obligation to value others needs because one needs others to value
one’s own needs. In short, humility’s principle is healthy codependence, which leads to beneficence.
15
Kierkegaard, Soren; Howard V. Hong and Edna H Hong. Kierkegaards Writings, V, Volume 5: Eighteen
Upbuilding Discourses: Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. Princeton University Press., n.d. Four Upbuilding
Discourses, “To Need God is a Human Being’s Highest Perfection.”
–Robert C. Roberts notes that Kierkegaard seems to be making a connection between humility and self-knowledge.
See article in bibliography by Roberts titled “Is Kierkegaard a “Virtue Ethicist?””
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Given this rich history between humility and self-knowledge, the main problem is that
virtue epistemology has little to say about the role that the intellectual virtues play in selfknowledge accounts. Because virtue epistemology is still emerging onto the scene, it is fair to
suggest that self-knowledge accounts are still catching up with the epistemological trends of the
moment. This project will ultimately examine the relationship between intellectual humility and
self-knowledge.

The Thesis and its Main Elements
The thesis statement that will be defended in this work can be put as follows: Intellectual
humility is necessary for self-knowledge of one’s character because this kind of selfknowledge requires critical self-reflection. There are two common challenges to selfknowledge that require critical self-reflection. The first challenge is one that is introduced by
Søren Kierkegaard in the Sickness Unto Death and Either/Or. This challenge will be referred to
as the problem of fantastical self-conception. The second challenge is a kind of blameworthy
self-ignorance; a form of self-ignorance that Quassim Cassam connects with intellectual
arrogance, vanity, and hubris. While self-conception and self-ignorance are not inherently bad in
and of themselves, they pose serious limitations to self-knowledge, and therefore the humble and
responsible agent will recognize these challenges, and will critically self-reflect. This is
precisely why intellectual humility is necessary for the virtuous life, because honest critical selfreflection demands intellectual humility.
In order to defend the thesis, three key elements will be introduced: The history, the
philosophical framework, and the argument. Chapter 1 will serve as an historical framework for
virtue epistemology in the twenty-first century. To be sure, virtue epistemology is thriving at the
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moment, but this was not the case nearly fifty years ago. There is a much larger historical piece
of the puzzle that accounts for why virtue epistemology is now being taken seriously as an
epistemological methodology. In other words, to understand why intellectual virtues play a
central role in virtue epistemology, there is a larger story that deserves to be told. Alongside the
Aristotelian revival of virtue ethics ushered in by Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, Linda
Zagzebski’s seminal work Virtues of the Mind got the ball rolling on the virtue epistemology
front towards the tail end of the twentieth century. However, the epistemological paradigm shift
away from Logical Positivism and JTB Theory had much to do with an article produced by
Edmund Gettier titled Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? ; the core idea of this article is
commonly referred to as the Gettier problem. Chapter 1 will examine this historical problem,
and demonstrate why the Gettier problem led to paradigm shifts in epistemology.
Chapter 2 will be more philosophical and analytic in nature. The ultimate aim of this
chapter is to define intellectual character virtues and faculty virtues, as well as to broadly
introduce virtue epistemology as a methodology. The main reason for this is because the thesis
tacitly operates within the epistemological paradigm of virtue epistemology. In order to
accomplish this, the first part of Chapter 2 will offer a thorough engagement with Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics as a philosophical framework for the intellectual virtues. Aristotle’s
account of the virtues of the mind is somewhat on par with what is commonly meant by faculty
virtues, but the concept of an intellectual character virtue is somewhat foreign to his philosophy.
Nevertheless, virtue epistemologists frequently draw structural parallels between intellectual
character virtues and Aristotle’s virtues of character. Therefore, Aristotle’s account of the
character virtues will be thoroughly examined.

6

Chapter 3 will serve as the final element of the essay, and this is where the thesis will be
argued and defended. The first part of this chapter will offer two leading accounts of intellectual
humility: The Low-concern account and the Limitations-owning account. Alongside this, the
ideas of virtue epistemologist John Greco will be examined to emphasize the social dimensions
of intellectual humility. Following this, Quassim Cassam’s account of substantial selfknowledge will be introduced, which is a bit different from Kant’s use of the term.16 Finally, the
thesis will be argued, and the chapter will conclude with a few closing clarifications.
The overall role of intellectual humility in the final section draws on insights from both
the Low-concern and the Limitations-owning accounts, as well as social epistemology. It is not
obvious why one account should be the right or the only account; nor does one need to be a
reductionist on such matters. As it happens, there is not even a general consensus in the field as
a whole as to what intellectual humility really is. Nevertheless, accounts of intellectual humility
paint the humble person as someone that would desire self-knowledge, as someone who values
epistemic goods enough to accept the true reality about oneself over and above prideful selfconceptions and self-ignorance. The main reason for this is because self-knowledge as an
epistemic good has practical value for character development. That is, to know oneself is the
beginning of the virtuous life, because self-knowledge makes character management volitionally
possible.
Keeping with the Kantian spirit, the humble person in general knows that one is human,
and to be human necessarily entails that one is imperfect, corrupt, and dependent on others for
all sorts of things. Given that self-knowledge is an epistemic good, the intellectually humble
person will own one’s cognitive limitations for self-knowledge, and will be disposed to critically

16

Cassam’s use of the term is reflected in thesis statement above.
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self-reflect. When necessary, the humble person will accept a less than ideal reality about one’s
own character because it is the truth, and will use this self-knowledge as a springboard to
become a more virtuous person. Beyond this, the humble person will value others because one
realizes that codependency is a necessary feature of humanity, and this no doubt has many
epistemic implications.

8

1. Epistemology in the Twentieth Century Firmament
Throughout the course of western history philosophers have been interested in the
knowledge concept. While a vast number of philosophers agree that knowledge is at least true
belief, many have argued that knowledge is more than this. In the contemporary era specifically,
many have analyzed knowledge in a way that views justification as a central component of the
knowledge concept. That is, one has knowledge if and only if one possesses a true belief, and
one has sufficient justification for that belief. Epistemologists in the second half of the twentieth
century demonstrated problems with this approach to knowledge, which ultimately led to a surge
in virtue epistemology. Understanding this history is crucial for understanding the normative
scene of epistemology in the twenty-first century.
This particular section will offer an historical analysis of the twentieth century debate
over JTB Theory (i.e. justified, true belief). In order to accomplish this, section 1.1 will explore
themes from Plato’s [Socratic] dialogue Theaetetus in order to lay the foundations for
epistemology in the contemporary era. Following this, section 1.2 will introduce JTB knowledge
theory, as well as Logical Positivism’s connections to David Hume’s philosophy. Section 1.3
will introduce the famous Gettier problem in contemporary epistemology, and section 1.4 will
examine the No-defeater and No-false-lemma responses to the Gettier problem. Section 1.5 will
turn to examine Alvin Plantinga’s reliabilist response to Gettier, and section 1.6 will examine
Linda Zagzebski’s criticism of justification and warrant. Finally, section 1.7 will close by
pinpointing deeper methodological concerns with epistemological Intuitionism.
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1.1 Plato’s Theaetetus
In Plato’s epistemological masterpiece Theaetetus, there is a threefold Socratic dialogue
taking place between Socrates, an astronomer named Theodorus, and his pupil, a young boy
called Theaetetus. The bulk of the first part of the dialogue is between Socrates and Theaetetus,
in which Socrates seeks to dialectically elicit the truth in Theaetetus concerning the nature of
knowledge itself—not merely knowledge about something—by posing difficult questions to the
young boy. It is through this dialectical process that Socrates’s intellectual “midwifery” is
displayed, as the concept of knowledge is slowly born within Theaetetus. In totality, there are
three different definitions of knowledge put forth in Theaetetus, in which the logical
development of the dialogue, in its fullness, takes the form of a disjunctive syllogism. That is,
definition one is proposed, but given that it is problematic, a second definition is offered. When
definition two is shown to be problematic, it is abandoned for definition three, etc. While the
ultimate focus will be on the third definition, it will be important to briefly cover the first two
bases before then.
The first definition Theaetetus entertains is that: “knowledge is simply perception.”17
While Socrates accepts this definition for the sake of argument, further deliberation between the
crew unveils crucial problems with this theory. First, Socrates raises the problem of dreams and
misperceptions, that is, if knowledge is merely perception, then it is not clear how one is capable
of distinguishing reality from dreams.18 To draw out this tension further, Socrates notes that half
of one’s life is spent asleep, and therefore one should have no reason to epistemically prefer the
objects of one’s conscious experience over the objects of one’s dreams.19

17
Plato, Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, M. J. Levett, and Myles Burnyeat. Theaetetus. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992.
151d
18
Ibid, 157e-158a
19
Ibid, 158c-d
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Another immediate problem for knowledge defined as perception is memory recollection.
Socrates raises the point that if someone is perceiving something, does not knowledge as
perception imply that one’s knowledge flees the very moment the object ceases to be
perceived?20 On a similar note, if one recalls to mind an image or event from one’s memory
bank, do not most people consider this to be a kind of knowledge?21 What is more, how can
knowledge ever be advanced if one cannot reflect on the previous objects of perceptual
experience stored in one’s memories? Given these problems and others that are raised in the
dialogue, the first definition of knowledge is abandoned by both Socrates and Theaetetus, and the
group works towards a new, more robust definition of knowledge.
The next definition of knowledge offered by Socrates involves the epistemic function of
judgement. Socrates and Theaetetus distinguish between experience and judgement. In short,
experience is defined as the sum of one’s perceptions, which involves the powers of the senses to
impress upon the soul.22 Judgment, on the other hand, is a more basic faculty or function of the
soul that is intimately involved with one’s ability to reason through experiences; judgement is
motivated by an appetite for being, that is, it is purely concerned with grasping the truth of
things.23 With that being said, Theaetetus entertains a second epistemic definition: knowledge as
true judgement.24 The nature of human judgement will prove to be incredibly significant for any

20

Ibid, 164 (all)
This problem clearly influenced Lockean forms of representational realism. That is, one has an internal sense or
eye that perceives sense-datum’s that are generated by one’s sensible faculties. To be sure, John Locke affirmed
that internal sense-datum solves this problem raised by Socrates, as memory recollection brings to mind real images
that serve as faithful representations of real objects, and are perceived internally.
22
As a brief aside, he does mention that experience has no direct share in knowledge. That is, Socrates seems to be
implying that while experiences provide content for judgment and knowledge, experience is not knowledge itself, as
already established.
23
Ibid
24
Ibid, location 186b-187 (all)
21
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inquiry of knowledge, and as for Plato, this is particularly important for the final definition of
knowledge offered at the end of Theaetetus.
To summarize, Socrates postulates that judgement has one of two possible natures: either
judgment is infallible or fallible. Firstly, when one judges truly one judges what is; when one
judges falsely, it would seem that one judges what is not, and by extension, according to
Socrates, one does not even judge at all.25 In essence, Socrates notes that humans only seem to be
capable of judging what is true, as judgment is concerned with grasping the essential nature of
something, and it would be absurd, perhaps even contradictory, to suggest that one is capable of
passing judgement on something one does not know or perceive.26 That is, the notion of ‘false
judgment’ seems to imply a contradiction of terms.
Yet Socrates affirms that false judgements are possible for two reasons: applied
knowledge from memory is not sure proof, nor are one’s sense perceptions infallible. Socrates
states:
We may sum up thus: it seems that in the case of things we do not know and have never
perceived, there is no possibility of error or of false judgement, if what we are saying is at
all sound; it is in cases where we both know things and are perceiving them that
judgement is erratic and varies between truth and falsity. When it brings together the
proper stamps and imprints directly and in straight lines, it is true; when it does so
obliquely and crosswise, it is false.27
In addition to this, Socrates notes that false judgements are just as possible a priori as
they are a posteriori. That is, one can err in both mathematics and matters of perception. This
leads Socrates to distinguish between what he calls possessing and having knowledge. Socrates
suggests that having knowledge in mind is to call to the forefront of the mind something one
knows, while possessing knowledge is to have knowledge stored away in the recesses of the

25

Ibid, 188d
The simple force of this argument is reminiscent of a common epistemic maxim: speak only of what you know.
27
Ibid, 194a-b
26
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mind. Given this distinction, arithmetical error is possible because one can fail to have in mind
some knowledge that one already possesses.28 In other words, someone may know something,
but fail to call to the forefront of the mind that which one already knows, for whatever given
reason. As an example, if an educated person were to make the arithmetical error 7+5=11, it is
not necessarily that one does not know that the sum is 12, but rather one simply fails to call to
mind the correct sum.29 Therefore, one makes a false judgement.
To offer a brief summary up to this point, let us revisit the definition offered at the
beginning of Theaetetus. At the very beginning, Socrates entertains that knowledge is
perception, which is shown to be faulty; but just to be clear, this does not make perception any
less epistemically valuable, it just simply entails that perception and knowledge are not the same
thing. In this sense, perception still plays a role in knowledge for Socrates, namely, it provides at
least some of the content that human reason engages with, as the soul is impressed by perceptual
experiences. But if the reader recalls what was said above, it is the more basic faculty of
judgement that is involved with the ontology and truth value of things, and it is for this reason
that judgement is more intimately connected with knowledge. Thus, Socrates entertains the
definition of knowledge as true judgment. It will now be prudent to identify why knowledge as
true judgement is deemed faulty by Socrates, before moving to explore the third definition.
As it pertains to knowledge as true judgment, Socrates suggests something that most
contemporary philosophers disagree with concerning the epistemic nature of testimony. That is,
Socrates seems to imply that knowledge cannot be transmitted through testimony.30 In short,
Socrates gives an example of a courtroom in which a particular witness testifies to what the

28

Ibid , location 199 (all)
Ibid, 199a-b
30
Most contemporary philosophers affirm that knowledge can be transmitted through trustworthy testimony.
29
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witness alone experienced firsthand.31 Nevertheless, despite the fact that the jury was not present
to experience what was being testified to by the witness, they are still capable of making true
judgements based on the witness’s faithful testimony, even though this judgement is completely
disconnected from the experience. In short, no one on the jury perceived firsthand the events
being testified to, but in the end, they still made true judgements. For Socrates, this eliminates
true judgement alone from being knowledge, because it is completely disconnected from
experience. Thus, while the jurors made true judgments, they did not have knowledge.
At this point for Socrates, neither perception nor true judgement in and of themselves
count as knowledge, because perceptive experience can prove faulty at times, and true judgement
can occur apart from firsthand experience. Needless to say, it would seem that these particular
epistemic functions are only parts of knowledge, and as a result, another component is desired.
In light of this, Socrates and Theaetetus offer a third definition of knowledge: “knowledge is true
judgement with an account.”32
There are three different definitions of an account that Socrates proposes. The first
proposal is that knowledge is accounted for when one expresses thoughts through verbal and
non-verbal forms of speech. Socrates likens this kind of speech to seeing one’s reflection in a
mirror, in which one’s words reflect one’s internal thoughts.33 Being dissatisfied with this first
definition, the second definition of an account offered has more to do with one’s being
questioned, that is, if one is questioned about one’s knowledge of something, then one must
adequately be able to refer to its most basic elements.34 In essence, one must have knowledge of

31

Ibid, 201 (all)
Ibid, 202 (all)
33
Ibid, 206c-d
34
Ibid, 206e-207
32
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a thing’s most basic parts to be able to give an adequate account of it. Again, Socrates is
dissatisfied with this definition as well.
Given that Socrates is not content with the previous two definitions of epistemic
accounts, he lastly suggests that account ought to be concerned with the differentness of
particular instances of universals. For example, while one might have in mind the universal
concept of what it means to be a human person, this is distinct from what it means to know a
particular human person, that is, to know what uniquely distinguishes an individual person from
another person (i.e. one knows what makes Theaetetus distinct from Theodorus, and the like).
Socrates writes: “So, it seems, the answer to the question ‘What is knowledge?’ will be ‘Correct
judgement accompanied by knowledge of the differentness’—for this is what we are asked to
understand by the ‘addition of an account.’”35
The overall significance of this final definition comes from the conceptual structure of
the Socratic knowledge concept itself. That is, it is not so much the explicit content of Socrates’s
definition of an account that is of particular interest here, but more precisely the generic templet
of knowledge as true judgement plus an account. Contemporary epistemology in the twentieth
century was predominately concerned with answering Socrates’s fundamental question: What
component needs to be added to true belief in order for it to be knowledge? The next section
will examine a popular twentieth century attempt to answer Socrates’s ancient proposition.

1.2 JTB Theory, Logical Positivism, and David Hume
The reason that key ideas from Plato’s Theaetetus have been explored here is because
there can be no doubt of its lasting impact on western epistemology. By and large, his third and
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final definition of knowledge is the chief aim of western epistemology: to develop an adequate
theory of knowledge as true judgment + an account. This basic vision, coupled with nearly
2,300 years of development in the fields of philosophy of mind, psychology, and epistemology,
has molded and shaped contemporary epistemology. However, the ancients still have a seat at
the head of the table, just as mainline contemporary knowledge theories are still chasing the
ancient Socratic vision. Many contemporary knowledge theories define knowledge in a tripart
fashion, and this tripart nature of the concept is owed to Socrates’s third and final definition
offered above.
In the mid to latter portion of the twentieth century, the predominant epistemological
theory was knowledge defined as a justified, true belief. Knowledge is a belief inasmuch as it is
an attitude of sorts towards either a proposition or a set of propositions. Knowledge is a true
belief inasmuch as one’s attitude is securely based in good judgement, that is, one’s ability to
assign truth value to a given proposition that corresponds with reality. Lastly, knowledge is a
justified belief inasmuch as one typically has a reason for why one believes what one does, and
this justificatory element both defends and confirms its epistemic status. For practical purposes,
this understanding of knowledge will be referred to as JTB Theory. To be sure, one has JTB
knowledge (S knows that P) if and only if the following conditions are met:
I.

S believes that P
II.

III.

P is true

S is justified in believing that P36

Again, while JTB theory reveals its Platonic roots, make no mistake that it has also been
influenced by trends in modern philosophy, just as the above definition reveals JTB theories tacit
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affirmation of the modern fact-value divide between epistemology and ethics. The fact-value
divide insists that epistemology is a factual discipline, in which epistemic judgments are in the
business of describing what is. On the other hand, ethics is a normative discipline, in which
moral judgements are in the business of describing what ought to be.37 This division between
matters of fact and value has origins in both Hume and Immanuel Kant.
For the time being, the inquiry at hand will examine he modern fact/value problem as it
pertains to David Hume’s epistemology, and then connect it to a radical twentieth century JTB
Theory known as Logical Positivism. The reason for doing this is not motivated by an attempt to
knock down straw men arguments that are no longer relevant to the philosophical community byand-large, but to give a brief glimpse into the historical current that led to the groundbreaking
work in epistemology during the second half of the twentieth century. This historical basis will
serve as an effective springboard into a more robust criticism of JTB Theory made by an
epistemologist named Edmund Gettier, which indirectly led to a neo-Aristotelian revival of
virtue epistemology.
As a preface to David Hume’s work, it will behoove the reader to call to mind the
groundbreaking development that occurred in the philosophy of mind during the early modern
era. Cartesian skepticism had sunk its teeth deep into the continent, and it would seem that most
philosophers were interested in giving an account of epistemic certainty in the face of
skepticism. The Rationalist movement led by the likes of Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and
G.W Leibniz built deductive logical systems on innate ideas, which served as foundational and
analytic axioms of thought upon which doxastic certainty was firmly fixed.38 Descartes famously
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proposed “Cogito ergo Sum;” Spinoza made an argument for the necessary idea of substance;
and Leibniz proposed his atomic theory in his famous work Monadology, as a rival to Sir Isaac
Newton.39
Alongside revolutionary work in epistemology, the early modern world was also shaken
by debates over the precise nature and function of judgement. The reader might recall a key
discussion from Plato’s Theaetetus above, in which Socrates entertains whether or not it is
possible to make false judgements. In specific, modern philosophers by the likes of Descartes,
Spinoza, and Blaise Pascal expanded the Socratic discussion on judgement, which had become
concerned with the role of the human will in the judgement process. Descartes believed in a
freedom of judgement whereby one could withhold assent, and Blaise Pascal’s Voluntarism
more or less affirmed that judgment is entirely volitional; on the contrary, Spinoza’s determinism
was highly influential, and it permeated every aspect of his own worldview, including the two
independent closed systems of physics and psychology.40 Spinoza once wrote: “There is in the
mind no absolute, i.e. no free, will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause,
which is again determined by another, and that again by another, and so on to infinity.”41
Rationalism was countered by sixteenth and seventeenth century British Empiricism,
which is properly where Hume is situated in the history of philosophy. Being inspired by John
Locke, George Berkeley, and those listed above, David Hume set out on a radical philosophical
project of his own. The general aim of Hume’s famous project An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding was to offer a precise and clear investigation into the faculties of the human mind
39
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and by so doing, offer some sort of unity amongst the various sciences and philosophies that
exist. His general criticism of human knowledge by and large is that various philosophical
systems and sciences ascribe different forms of knowledge to the natural faculties of the mind,
operating under the presumption that the mind is equipped with epistemic powers and abilities to
grasp physical laws and universal truths. For Hume, this was a terrible mistake. He believed
that until an intelligent philosophy of mind was offered, that is, a careful inquiry into the various
mental faculties of the mind and, more precisely, their epistemic potency, one cannot begin to
unify the different philosophies and sciences, as one cannot even offer an intelligent account of
the respective mental faculties employed in their development.42 To offer a pure philosophy of
mind, this means that one must inquire with a willingness to forsake philosophical tradition and
religious dogma, as subscription to such authorities taints and restricts intellectual freedom.
Hume begins the technical side of his project by offering his own articulation of Lockean
terms, in which he categorizes the perceptions of the mind into two distinct categories: ideas and
impressions.43 To be sure, any idea, thought, belief, or account of knowledge, is classified within
these two categories; that is, all the inner content of the human mind is reducible to either an
impression or the synthesis of both an impression and a reflection, which together form an idea.
To clarify his terms, Hume defines impressions as the kind of sensations people have when
engaging the world around them. In this category he places sense perceptions, emotions, and the
human will.44 As it pertains to the category if ideas, Hume suggests that ideas are the products of
self-reflection upon one’s impressions. The result is that all ideas are dependent upon
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impressions, and all mental activity is a synthesis of sorts, in which the faculties of the mind
engage with internal mental phenomena. Hume’s summation is as follows:
In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward
sentiment: The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or,
to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are
copies of our impressions or more lively ones.45
Hume offers a final maxim by which one can navigate the epistemic value of any abstract
philosophical ideas that are not clear; this maxim is very important. He writes:
When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed
without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what
impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will
serve to confirm our suspicion.46
Hume’s connection between impressions and meaning has far reaching implications
beyond mere deliberation within the guild. Hume goes on to offer another categorical division
between “relations of ideas and matters of fact.”47 On the one hand, the relations of ideas
category has abstract mathematical disciplines as its object of inquiry; the propositional objects
of these fields are discoverable by the application of reason in thought, and have no real
connection with the world of experience. On the other hand, the matters of fact category has
physical objects as its objects of inquiry. Matters of fact ultimately rest on the law of noncontradiction, and require experiential, demonstrable proof to validate their adherence to the law
of non-contradiction.48 In short, if one can link a philosophical idea to an impression, but cannot
empirically verify whether or not such an idea is true, then it is beyond the power of the human
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understanding to make any intelligent judgements concerning the reality of said idea.49 For
practical reasons, this will be referred to as Hume’s Verification Principle.
Perhaps the most notorious criticism of realism that Hume offered in his Enquiry is his
criticism of the metaphysical principle of cause and effect, which he deemed to be the underlying
principle of all matters of fact.50 Hume’s Verification Principle for cause and effect led him to
postulate that the principle of cause and effect is not something known a priori, but is something
that can only arise from the experience of conjoined objects.51 Hume goes on to suggest:
No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes
which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted
by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.52
As it pertains to the laws of physics, Hume finds no a priori reason to suggest that one’s
expectation of what will happen in the next moment, if one hits one billiards ball towards
another, should have any priority over the manifold of other scenarios that could possibly
unfold.53 In essence, the early modern quest for certainty is suspect, as human knowledge seems
to be both probable and fallible at best.
The later influence of Hume’s Verification Principle for late nineteenth and early
twentieth century philosophy culminated in the emergence of Logical Positivism, whose
adherents held that all knowledge and meaningful statements must be factual in nature and
ultimately reducible to demonstrable proof. It would seem that Hume’s matters of fact category,
now appropriated by the Vienna Circle, was no longer pitted against the abstract ideas of
mathematics, but was pitted against anything that did not adhere to the Logical Positivist’s
49
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reductionistic principle of verification. To be sure, a realist approach to various kinds of
mathematics led to an extraordinary level of confidence in the efficaciousness of the scientific
method to grasp necessary truth; thus, there was a newfound harmony between a priori and a
posteriori forms of knowledge. Furthermore, following the rise of Nihilism and the First Great
War, it would seem that the enlightenment project to ground morality in reason had failed, and
alongside this, value judgments were tossed into the camp of what ought to be, and not what is,
given they did not adhere to positivist principles.
In essence, Logical Positivism affirmed that science is the only form of knowledge, and
that science is compatible with the necessary a priori truths of logic and mathematics. The
implications of Logical Positivism for epistemology and linguistics is that any judgements or
beliefs that lie beyond the scope of science are meaningless.54 In short, all knowledge must be
both factual and empirically justifiable in the Humean sense of the term, that is, through a
demonstrable proof of sorts that ultimately rests on the law of non-contradiction. While it would
be absurd to suggest that JTB Theory is only compatible with logical positivism or naturalistic
reductionism, it is worth noting that Logical Positivism was largely abandoned in the mid
twentieth century. This abandonment played a modern-day John the Baptist role of sorts
concerning problems with JTB Theory in general. In short, the death of Logical Positivism came
in a similar fashion to the death of metaphysical first principles at the hands of David Hume’s
criticism of realism, in which he argued that the principle of cause and effect cannot be known
per say on empiricist grounds. Logical Positivism near collapsed under the weight of its own
presuppositions; it near collapsed under the weight of its inability to justify itself by its own
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epistemic principles, or as they say: ‘the wagon was placed before the horse.’ Furthermore, a
short paper written by Edmund Gettier was the final straw that broke the camel’s back.

1.3 The Gettier Problem and Epistemic Luck
In 1963 an epistemologist named Edmund Gettier produced a very short article revealing
problems with JTB Theory accounts of knowledge, and this little philosophical rudder steered
the whole western epistemological ship into entirely new waters. In his article, Gettier offered
three different biconditional accounts of knowledge, the first of which was JTB Theory. S knows
that P if and only if:
I.

S believes that p
II.

III.

p is true

S is justified in believing that p55

The other two positions are very similar to the JTB model, one of which was put forth by
prominent Logical Positivist AJ Ayer: S knows that p if and only if: p is true, S is sure that p is
true, S has the right to be sure that p is true.56 Another was put forth by an epistemologist named
Roderick Chisolm, S knows that p if and only if: S accepts that p, S has adequate evidence for p,
p is true.57 In essence, Gettier saw both Ayer and Chisolm’s models as being mere renditions of
JTB Theory, and he felt that if he could defeat the basic JTB model, then he could defeat JTB
Theory.
Gettier’s article demonstrated problems with JTB theory as he provided examples in
which all the conditions for JTB Theory were met, but problems still remained. That is, the crux
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of the Gettier article centers around practical examples that meet all the conditions for JTB
Theory and yet, even while all the conditions for JTB Theory are satisfied, S still does not know
that p. Formally, Gettier imagines possible worlds in which S believes that p; p is true; and S is
justified in believing that p; but S still doesn’t know that p. While the agents in Gettier’s
examples meet all the conditions for JTB Theory, it would seem, intuitively, that their
‘knowledge’ is the result of mere lucky guesses and coincidence. The basic structure of a
Gettier-case example starts with a sufficiently justified belief that meets the justification
component, and then proceeds to add a double luck element to the scenario. That is, first there is
an element of bad luck in the scenario which would normally lead subject S to have a false
belief. However, lucky for the subject, there is a further development in which the bad luck is
negated by a stroke of good luck. Therefore, in the end subject S has true belief p accidentally.58
To offer a Gettier-like example, imagine that you’ve just walked into your favorite coffee
shop on a Saturday. Given that this is your favorite local coffee shop, you see two of your close
friends Griffin and Emily sitting at a table in the corner waiting for their coffee. Before going to
join them for the afternoon, you decide to order a beverage. While approaching the counter, you
quickly glance over to the table to see what Emily—a coffee connoisseur—is drinking, because
you usually employ her expertise to influence your own beverage choices. Additionally, you
know from previous experience that Emily typically orders the house blend. At a glance, you
notice that there is only one cup of coffee on the table in front of Emily. Quickly, by virtue of
your sharp eyesight and previous experience, you note that she ordered a cup of the house coffee,
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and so you decide to order one yourself. In essence, you form the simple belief that Emily
ordered a cup of the house blend.
Little to your knowledge, Griffin ordered the house coffee as well, and it just so happens
that when you first saw Griffin and Emily sitting at the table, Griffin’s cup had arrived first, and
it was actually his cup in front of Emily who, being rather cheeky and impatient, reached over to
sneak a sip of his coffee while waiting for her own, which at the time of your initial observation,
had not yet arrived. Knowing that Emily is a coffee connoisseur himself, Griffin, of course,
ordered a cup of the house coffee as well, which arrived at the table first. In short, at the time of
your initial observation there was only one cup of coffee on the table, Griffin’s cup; but it was
stationed right in front of Emily, a cheeky thief.
As you move to order your own house brew, and as your friends temporarily leave your
line of sight upon your approaching the counter, the plot thickens, and it just so happens that
Emily’s coffee arrives at the table, at which point Emily slides Griffin’s stolen cup of coffee
back to him, in order to make room for her own. This further development, of course, all
happens without your knowing it. To the best of your understanding, the cup that you thought
was Emily’s was actually Griffin’s, but by the time you arrive at the table to sit down, both
Emily and Griffin have a cup of the house coffee. As you sit down at the table to enjoy your
afternoon with your friends the question remains: Does your initial belief that Emily ordered a
cup of the house blend count as knowledge?
At first glance, it would seem that all the conditions for JTB Theory are met. First and
foremost, you believe that Emily ordered a cup of the house coffee. Secondly, this belief is a
true belief inasmuch as Emily did in fact order a cup of the house blend. Finally, this belief is
justified inasmuch as you clearly saw Emily drinking a cup of the house of blend, and you also
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have prior experience of Emily’s coffee drinking habits. To answer the question, it would seem
prima facie that even though all of the JTB conditions have been met, it still does not seem right
to say that you know that Emily ordered the house coffee, because your correct judgement is a
result of coincidental luck. In essence, this is the crux of the Gettier problem, that possible
worlds exist in which the conditions for JTB Theory are met but one still does not seem to have
knowledge. As long as epistemic luck and coincidence remain a possibility, some other
condition needs to be added to JTB Theory.

1.4 Responses to the Gettier Problem
The latter half of the 20th century saw numerous brilliant responses to the Gettier
problem. To offer a preceding clarification, some chose to respond to Gettier by amending JTB
Theory, while others opted for a paradigm shift in epistemology altogether.59 One such JTB
amender was epistemologist Michael Clark, who proposed his “No-False-Lemma” response to
the Gettier problem. Formally, Michael Clark’s position suggests that S knows that p if and only
if:
I.
II.
III.
IV.

p is true

S believes that p

S is justified in believing that p

It is on true grounds that S believes that p60

In essence, Clark’s condition IV suggests that in order for a rational agent to have knowledge,
she must have true grounds upon which she makes inferences; true grounds here implies the
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relevant set of true beliefs or facts needed for one to make an inference in any given scenario.
That is, for one to have knowledge, there cannot be some false lemma or belief that one bases
one’s inference or judgement upon. In the case of Emily and Griffin, Clark might suggest that
one would have JTB knowledge on true grounds if and only if one had all the correct beliefs and
facts needed to make a true inference. To be sure, because there is a false belief in the coffee
shop scenario, namely, that you believe Griffin’s cup to be Emily’s, Clark would suggest that it
was not on true grounds that you inferred that Emily ordered a cup of the house blend. As a
result, your belief does not count as knowledge because you did not meet all the conditions for
knowledge.
Another response by amendment to the Gettier problem was offered by philosophers
Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson. In similar fashion, they suggested that an additional condition
needs to be added to JTB Theory, which for them was a no-defeater clause. To be sure, this
condition only applies to a certain kind of knowledge commonly referred to as non-basic
knowledge.61 Non-basic knowledge is contrasted with basic knowledge which is more
foundational in nature, and can be defined as a belief that is not held on other beliefs one holds
(i.e. the belief that I am in pain). Non-basic knowledge, then, is what Gettier problems are
concerned with: the kind of knowledge that is propositional in nature, and which requires a
reasonable form of positivist justification. One has non-basic knowledge if and only if the
following conditions are satisfied:
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I.

S believes that p
II.

III.
IV.

p is true

S is justified in believing that p

There is no defeater for S’s belief that p62

The no-defeater condition essentially suggests that there is no counter fact unbeknownst to S
which defeats his belief that p.63
While similar to Clark’s example, it is not nearly as strong of a condition.64 Clark’s
fourth condition suggests that one must have true grounds for forming inferences, constituted by
a set of true beliefs; whereas Lehrer and Paxson’s position does not make such a strong claim,
but suggests that there cannot be some knockdown fact lurking in the shadows, unbeknownst to
the agent. In other words, Lehrer and Paxson suggest that one does not need to have a complete
set of true beliefs or true grounds to have non-basic knowledge, one only needs to be sure that
there is not some contradictory fact which defeats one’s justified true belief that p.
In the case of Emily and Griffin, a no-defeater proponent might respond to this scenario
by suggesting that while the initial belief that Emily ordered a cup of the house blend satisfies
the first three conditions, the inquiry was not pushed far enough because clearly there exists
some counter fact that defeats the initial belief, namely, the fact that one’s judgment is based on
a misunderstanding of whose cup was whose. While Clark’s condition suggests that one needs
to have true grounds in order to have knowledge concerning what Emily ordered—which would
necessarily include insight into the fact that it was initially Griffin’s cup of coffee in front of
Emily at the time of your judgment—a no-defeater proponent would not see this as necessary.
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For all intents and purposes, one does not need to know whose cup is whose to have knowledge
here, rather, to the best of one’s awareness, one just needs to be sure that there does not exist
some counterfactual evidence or defeater which knocks down one’s original belief that Emily did
in fact order a cup of the house blend. To accomplish this, the no-defeater proponent might find
it prudent for one to simply ask Emily what she ordered, and in this sense, one could come to
know that Emily ordered the house blend, while maybe even still possessing some false belief(s)
in the process. That is, one might go on, for whatever reason, believing that Griffin’s cup was
Emily’s on false grounds, but so long as one is certain that Emily ordered a cup of the house
blend—and that there is not some defeater lurking in the background—then one’s belief that
Emily ordered a cup of the house blend counts as knowledge.
While there are certainly many other noteworthy responses to the Gettier problem, the
general response by many epistemologists—as seen with the two positions just explored—was to
add a fourth condition to JTB Theory in order to avoid Gettier problems of epistemic luck.
While many took a fourth-condition approach in an attempt to salvage JTB Theory, others in the
latter half of the twentieth century felt that another approach altogether was needed. One such
philosopher was Alvin Plantinga, who replaced justification with his concept of epistemic
warrant.

1.5 Alvin Plantinga and Warrant
Alvin Plantinga largely expounded on the theory of epistemological Reliabilism. Generic
Reliabilism is an epistemological method that loosely affirms: “S’s belief that p at t is justified iff
it is the outcome of a process of belief acquisition or retention that is reliable, or leads to a
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sufficiently high preponderance of true beliefs over false beliefs.”65 While many reliabilists
opted to drop justification from the knowledge concept altogether, others viewed Reliabilism as
an external means of justification. That is, the justifying property of one’s knowledge is external
to the consciousness of the person (i.e. evidence, a reliable faculty or method, etc.). To offer a
brief example of this kind of model, suppose that a middle school student uses a hypotheticaldeductive method to form a belief, such as the scientific method. Let us also suppose that this
student does not understand why the scientific method is valuable, but that she only uses the
scientific method because she was instructed to do so by her science teacher. To be clear, a
reliabilist might suggest that the student does not need to consciously understand why such a
method is useful or valuable in the first place. In order to be justified, the student only needs to
use this reliable method and form some true belief and voilà, she has justification, given that the
justifying properties of her belief are in the facts and evidence that the scientific method
employs.
To emphasize Reliabilism and externalist theories of justification further, it is helpful to
draw a parallel with moral philosophy. Linda Zagzebski, in her seminal work Virtues of the
Mind, parallels reliabilism with consequentialist ethics. To be sure, consequentialism can be
modeled as follows: action A is morally good if it yields some good state of affairs S.66 On a
consequentialist ethical model, action A is not justified by the action itself, nor the character of
the agent; rather, action A is justified if it plays an instrumental role in obtaining some good state
of affairs S. Simply put, if the consequences are good, then action A is retrospectively justified
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by S. One might say that the ends justify the means. The same holds for a true belief obtained
on a reliabilist, externalist model of knowledge. That is, an agent’s belief is not justified by
some internal cognitive awareness or account, but rather, if the agent employs a reliable method
for obtaining some true belief B, then true belief B is retrospectively justified by the reliable
method of inquiry. In essence, if one is consistently forming true beliefs via one’s eyesight, then
eyesight clearly proves to be a reliable method of obtaining true beliefs; therefore, one’s true
beliefs are justified by the reliable method of obtainment, one’s eyesight, because the
consequences of looking yields true beliefs. Once more, the ends justify the means; that is, the
obtainment of true beliefs validates the means employed.
Alvin Plantinga largely accepted the basic tenants of Reliabilism. However, he further
suggested that knowledge has more to do with both the proper functioning of one’s epistemic
faculties, and one’s having warrant for one’s beliefs. With his approach, Plantinga largely
sought to shift the paradigm away from a basic JTB approach by substituting justification with
the concept of warrant. As it pertains to the knowledge concept, Plantinga realizes that his
attempt to shift the epistemic paradigm requires a thorough development of warrant. He writes:
To return to warrant then: to a first approximation, we may say that a belief B has warrant
for S if and only if the relevant segments (the segments involved in the production of B)
are functioning properly in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which
S’s faculties are designed; and the modules of the design plan governing the production
of B are (1) aimed at truth, and (2) such that there is a high objective probability that a
belief formed in accordance with those modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) is
true; and the more firmly S believes B the more warrant B has for S.67
Just to be sure, Plantinga still affirms that knowledge is true belief plus something else, but
again, Plantinga does not add a fourth condition to JTB Theory, rather he revises the knowledge
concept by substituting justification with epistemic warrant. While Plantinga thinks that the
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above definition is more of a “hint” or definitional approximation of warrant, his rough account
helps the reader identify salient features of his epistemology. For all intents and purposes, it will
be helpful to briefly identify those key features, beginning with proper function.
There are three conditions of warrant that Plantinga identifies: proper function, design
plan, and reliability. Proper function quite simply entails that one’s “noetic equipment”
involved in both belief formation and belief sustainment are working correctly.68 In essence, he
suggests that one’s intellectual abilities and sense faculties need to be functioning in the way
they are intended to function. This, of course, appears to be self-evident and unproblematic. For
example, in a court of law it is standard for witnesses to be called to the stand to testify on behalf
of their firsthand experiences. If, however, a witness’s intellectual ability to recollect past events
from one’s memory bank is damaged for some reason, the credibility and value of the witness’s
testimony is compromised, and may even be disposed of altogether. Thus, Plantinga’s definition
of warrant suggests that one’s relevant epistemic faculties and noetic abilities at least need to be
working properly for one to have warrant. In the case of the witness, given that her memory
recollection is not working properly for whatever reason, she does not have warrant for her
beliefs about past events. By extension, her testimony is not valid, and does not hold up in a
court of law.
The second feature of warrant Plantinga identifies is the design plan. This condition is
added to warrant because proper function alone is not enough to ensure that one’s beliefs are
warranted. Plantinga suggests that warrant requires one’s belief forming mechanisms to be both
aimed at truth and functioning properly within a cognitive environment that they were designed
to function within.69 Plantinga insists that one’s cognitive faculties serve many different
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functions, and therefore there needs to be a condition for truth and compatibility between a
cognitive agent and one’s environment for warrant to obtain. To demonstrate this, Plantinga
appeals to many different cases in which one’s belief formation is motivated for something other
than truth. Feuerbachian and Freudian accounts of wishful thinking, desperate survival
situations, happiness, and even desire for friendship, are all scenarios that involve beliefs; but
according to Plantinga, these beliefs are aimed at something other than knowledge.70
To offer a possible example of an ulterior motivation for belief formation, suppose that a
man has just been diagnosed with a terminal sickness that has a 5% survival rate across the
board. Even in this unfortunate scenario, despite the low probability of survival, he might still
have an unwavering optimism that he is going to overcome his sickness. That is, the patient
forms the belief that he will survive.71 In this given scenario, it would seem inappropriate to
suggest that one’s optimistic belief is warranted per say, because the belief in question is
motivated for survival, not knowledge. Thus, while one’s noetic equipment is functioning
properly, i.e. one forms optimistic beliefs and maintains positive attitudes in the interest of
survival, something else is needed to confer warrant, and by extension, to have knowledge. In
the case of the overly optimistic patient, his noetic faculties allow him to form beliefs helpful for
survival, but even if the patients overly optimistic beliefs don’t count as knowledge per say, it
would not be right to suggest that his noetic faculties are malfunctioning. Rather, it seems more
appropriate to recognize that his belief forming mechanisms serve multiple purposes, and in this
case, they were not aimed for truth; for this reason, clarification concerning the purposive design
of one’s noetic faculties is in order.
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To emphasize the importance of the design plan further, suppose that there exists a
hypothetical world in which people never die. In such a world, it would seem prima facie absurd
to form overly optimistic beliefs in the way the overly optimistic patient formed his belief about
his capability to beat his sickness, because in a world without death, the need for doxastic
optimism in the face of death is not necessary. As a result, overly optimistic beliefs in this
hypothetical, immortal utopia might be the result of an epistemic malfunction of sorts, because
the world does not demand exaggerated optimism, given that improbable survival scenarios do
not exist. The general point is that cognitive agency seems to be conditioned by the real
demands of one’s cognitive environment, and malfunction, at the very least, occurs when one’s
faculties misfire, or fail to meet their intended purpose and function within a congenial cognitive
environment. In the interest of knowledge—as opposed to the other ends of our cognitive
faculties—and in order for one to have warrant, Plantinga suggests that one’s noetic faculties
must be functioning properly within an environment that they are designed to operate within, and
they must also be aimed at truth. Plantinga writes:
We take it that when the organs (or organic systems) of a human being (or other
organism) function properly, they function in a particular way. Such organs have a
function or purpose; more exactly, they have several functions or purposes, including
both proximate and more remote purposes.72 ... The purpose of the heart is to pump
blood; that of our cognitive faculties (overall) is to supply us with reliable information:
about our environment, about the past, about the thoughts and feelings of others, and so
on.73... What confers warrant is one’s cognitive faculties working properly, or working
according to the design plan insofar as the segment of the design plan is aimed at
producing true beliefs. But someone whose holding a certain belief is a result of an
aspect of our cognitive design that is aimed not at truth but at something else won’t be
such that the belief has warrant for him; he won’t properly be said to know the
proposition in question, even if it turns out to be true.74
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While the example of the overly optimistic patient demonstrates that noetic faculties serve
multiple purposes, Plantinga emphasizes that the part of the design plan that confers warrant is
the aimed-at-truth component. In essence, for warrant to be conferred, there needs to be proper
functioning of one’s noetic faculties that are aimed at truth, and this operation needs to occur
within an environment that said faculties were designed to operate within. But there is still one
more condition lacking according to Plantinga’s theory.
To be sure, Plantinga affirms that proper function within a congenial cognitive
environment is not quite enough for warrant alone, and for this reason, there needs to also be
added a condition of high probability and reliability of one’s epistemic faculties. Thus, the one
thing lacking is a degree of reliability or cognitive excellence in producing true beliefs.
Plantinga writes:
What must we add? That the design plan is a good one—more exactly, that the design
governing the production of the belief in question is a good one; still more exactly, that
the objective probability of a belief’s being true, given that it is produced by cognitive
faculties functioning in accord with the relevant module of the design plan, is high. Even
more exactly, the module of the design plan governing its production must be such that it
is objectively highly probable that a belief produced by cognitive faculties functioning
properly according to that module (in a congenial environment) will be true or
verisimilitudinous. This is the reliabilist constraint on warrant, and the important truth
contained in reliabilist accounts of warrant.75
Plantinga notes that his final component is consistent with broader epistemological reliabilism.
In essence, Plantinga’s model suggests that one has knowledge if and only if:
I.

S believes that p
II.

III.
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p is true

S has warrant for believing that p
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1.6 Problems with Justification and Warrant
While Plantinga opted to shift the paradigm by replacing justification with epistemic
warrant, many philosophers questioned the central role of justification and warrant altogether in
the knowledge concept. Linda Zagzebski published an article entitled The Inescapability of
Gettier Problems that addressed problems with Plantinga’s theory. In this article she not only
argued that JTB renditions cannot escape the Gettier problem, but that any JTB account of
knowledge—knowledge as true belief + something else—will always fall prey to Gettier cases of
epistemic luck. As it stands, Zagzebski makes it clear that Plantinga’s theory of warrant is no
exception, and the same goes for any reliabilist theory.76
To demonstrate the problem of reliabilism, Zagzebski alludes to Alvin Goldman’s
famous barn façade example. This example begins by suggesting that you, on a bright and
beautiful sunny day, find yourself driving through the countryside examining a manifold of barns
whose façade has the appearance of a real barn, but in actuality, most of the barns are fake. The
reason for this is that the people of the town erected three false barns for every real one, and from
a distance, the fakes are indistinguishable from the real ones. Given that your eyesight is
working properly, and that you could normally spot fake barns from up close, you see a real barn
off in the distance and form the true belief that’s a nice barn. On general reliabilist grounds,
even though your cognitive faculties are functioning properly—that is, your eyesight and
judgement faculties lead you to form true beliefs reliably—it still remains that your true belief is
true by accident and does not count as knowledge, because you could have easily mistaken the
real barn for a fake one.77 In short, your true belief does not count as knowledge, because at the
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end of the day, your forming a true belief is a serendipitous case of luck. The fake barn analogy
is significant because it demonstrates that both internalist and externalist justification theories
fall prey to Gettier problems.
Regardless of whether or not one takes an externalist or internalist approach to
justification, the force of Zagzebski’s argument ultimately rests on the Gettier problem itself.
That is, whether or not one adds conditions to JTB Theory or attempts to completely revise
justification altogether—as was the case with Plantinga’s project—so long as justification is
central to the knowledge concept, and so long as there is dissonance between the justification
component and the truth component, Gettier’s problem will always find a foothold. What is
more, as just mentioned, Plantinga’s theory has not escaped the problem either. Zagzebski
writes:
In discussing Gettier problems Plantinga concludes: ‘What is essential to Gettier
situations is the production of a true belief despite a relatively minor failure of the
cognitive situation to match its design’. But this comment is problematic on his own
account. As we have seen, Plantinga considers warrant a property that admits of degree,
but it is clear that the degree of warrant sufficient for knowledge does not require
faculties to be working perfectly in an environment perfectly matched to them. In
Gettier-style cases such as the case of Mary, either the degree of warrant is sufficient for
knowledge or it is not. If it is not, then a multitude of beliefs we normally think are
warranted are not, and there is much less knowledge in the world than Plantinga’s
numerous examples suggest. On the other hand, if the degree of warrant is sufficient for
knowledge, then Plantinga’s theory faces Gettier problems structurally identical to those
of the other theories.78
The main thing to conclude here is that any case of knowledge that allows for some
independence between the closely connected truth component and the justification/warrant
component are inevitably susceptible to Gettier problems.79 That is, so long as there is any
independence between justification and truth, Zagzebski argues there will always be a

78
79

Zagzebski, Linda. "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems." Page 69
Ibid, page 73

37

conceivable scenario in which one accidentally has a justified or warranted true belief; and
unless one is willing to admit that knowledge is true belief + x + luck, then a different approach
to knowledge altogether is needed.80 As a result, the Gettier problem has led many
epistemologists to forsake justification as a central component of knowledge altogether. That is
not to say that justified belief is not a valuable thing, nor does this imply that epistemologists are
disinterested in justification, but rather, that many epistemologists no longer view justified belief
to be a central aim of epistemology.
Given these problems with JTB Theory, Zagzebski partly led the charge to a surge in
virtue epistemology, which will be examined in Chapter 2. Before moving forward, it will be
prudent to identify some of the deeper problems with Gettier-era epistemology; to identify some
of the underlying methodological problems which led to a mass exodus away from the JTB
tradition. While Zagzebski demonstrated the insufficiency of the various responses within the
JTB tradition post-Gettier by highlighting further problems with justification and warrant, it is
helpful to probe just a little deeper to uncover a few basic methodological concerns.

1.7 Deeper Methodological Issues with Gettier Era Epistemology
Virtue epistemologist John Greco emphasizes that the key distinction between
epistemology in the JTB era and the twenty-first century is a difference of overall approach and
methodology. Greco writes:
In summary form, the story goes like this: During the Gettier era, the methodology of
epistemology was roughly what Chisolm called “particularism” and Rawls called “the
method of reflective equilibrium.” The driving concern of this kind of methodology was
to get the extension of the concept right, i.e. to provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for something’s counting as a case of knowledge. Various developments
forced an abandonment of this Gettier era methodology, in favor of several new
80
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constraints on an adequate theory of knowledge. Specifically, questions about the nature
of epistemic normativity, the relations between knowledge and action, the value of
knowledge, and the social dimensions of knowledge, all became important for
adjudicating among competing theories of knowledge.81
There are a few formal concepts that Greco introduces that will be helpful to briefly examine.
Greco identifies two common approaches to epistemology in the Gettier-era; these approaches
are what Roderick Chisolm calls “Particularism” and what John Rawls calls “The Method of
Reflective Equilibrium.”82 Particularism is the common Gettier-era approach which gives first
priority to one’s intuitions when determining which particular cases count as knowledge. For a
Particularist, once a particular case of knowledge has been intuited, only then is an
epistemologist in a position to evaluate certain conditions for obtaining knowledge.83 Contrary to
Particularism, Greco stresses that what Chisolm calls “Methodism” is the reverse, as it tends to
first prioritize intuitive accounts of the conditions needed for knowledge, and then, by extension,
evaluate whether or not certain cases meet the requisite conditions and principles set forth.84
Once the epistemic conditions are set, the epistemologist is in a position to examine particular
cases of knowledge.
In addition to both of these, John Rawls position is a synthetic approach to Particularism
and Methodism, in which he views both intuitions about particular cases and general epistemic
conditions for knowledge as equally significant; therefore intuitions of both kinds should both be
prioritized and brought together in equal harmony.85 Nevertheless, Greco identifies
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Particularism, Methodism, and Rawls theory of equilibrium as different forms of a similar
methodology, a methodology that he calls Intuitionism.86 To be sure, Particularism as a form of
Intuitionism best represents the various JTB amendment theories that were explored earlier in
this section, because each theory was largely crafted as a response to hypothetical
counterexamples that just [intuitively] don’t seem to count as knowledge (i.e. Gettier cases of
epistemic luck, fake barns, the coffee shop mix up, etc.).
Alongside the concerns advanced by Zagzebski, Greco points out three fundamental
problems with Gettier-era Intuitionism as a general approach to epistemology. First, he notes
that Intuitionism tends to produce epistemologies that are superficial in nature. He writes:
Specifically, these methodologies emphasize getting our extensions right, but an analysis
might do that while failing to generate philosophical insight or understanding. That is, an
analysis might successfully state necessary and sufficient conditions, but without getting
at the nature of things, or getting at essences, or “cutting things at the joints.” That such is
the case is suggested by the inelegance of many of the analyses generated during the
Gettier era. Famously, accounts of knowledge in that period became increasingly more
complex and ad hoc, creating the impression that intuitions were being accommodated
but not explained.87
Secondly, Greco stresses that one’s pre-theoretical intuitions largely dictate the overall shape of
one’s knowledge theory.88 That is, any number of theories guided by intuition could coherently
account for the data of a particular case, but that coherence does not necessarily entail that one’s
theory is reflective of reality.89 Lastly, Greco notes that there have been various empirical studies
undertaken which show intuition to be largely subjective as opposed to evidentially objective.
These studies reveal cultural variance concerning intuitions about Gettier cases, as well as
variance between trained philosophers and non-philosophers.90 The aforementioned problems of
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Intuitionism, coupled with Gettier and Zagzebski’s criticisms, represent some of the key
motivations which led to an epistemological paradigm shift in the twenty-first century.
In summary, Linda Zagzebski has pointed out that both internalist and externalist JTB
theories cannot escape the Gettier problem. What’s more, Alvin Plantinga’s decision to replace
the justification concept altogether with warrant fares no better. This section has demonstrated
that there is an overall conceptual and methodological problem with JTB Theory. These
problems have ultimately led many epistemologists to abandon the basic idea of knowledge as
justified, true belief. In other words, one might say that JTB Theory went down with the sinking
ship, given that the remains of the theory were unsalvageable from its detrimental clash with
Gettier’s article. In addition to Zagzebski’s criticism, John Greco noted that Gettier-era
Intuitionism is problematic as a methodology because of the overall subjective nature of
intuition, which fails to secure epistemological theories that get to the essence of reality. It also
seems that JTB amendment theories are developed ad hoc for the sake of methodological
consistency, and therefore coherence comes at the expense of both a pragmatic use of the word
knowledge, as well as a common sense understanding of reality.
One could further postulate that the Gettier problem is the ultimate result of the
longstanding spirit of Cartesian skepticism. The modern era of philosophy was born out of
Descartes’s attempt to establish epistemic foundations of thought which provide humans with
attitudes of axiomatic, epistemic certainty. Justification has long been the vehicle to satiate the
modern appetite for Cartesian certainty in all epistemic concerns. In a roundabout way, the end
of the previous millennium highlights various failures to absolutely secure non-basic knowledge,
given that possible worlds can always be conceived where one’s knowledge is merely the result
of chance or happenstance; where one’s ‘knowledge’ could have easily been false.
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To give credit where credit is due, the no-defeater proposal offered by Lehrer and Paxson
seems to be the best proposal for Gettier problems in the JTB tradition; it was a stroke of genius.
Nevertheless, their position seems to unveil the seemingly impossible condition needed to grant
epistemic certainty; the impossible condition of one’s being certain that there exists no defeaters
for one’s belief that p. This impossibility is revealed as the question is begged: How can one
ever be certain that there does not exist some defeater, unbeknownst to the agent, lurking in the
shadows? Unfortunately, as Zagzebski has shown, and given the fact that humans are not
omniscient, Gettier wrenches can always be thrown into any given JTB or Plantingian case of
knowledge ad infinitum.

Chapter 1 Summary
The beginning of this Chapter introduced key themes from Plato’s Theaetetus as the
foundational concern of contemporary epistemology. One of the primary aims of epistemology
is to offer an account of what is needed for knowledge beyond mere true belief. Logical
Positivists in the twentieth century acknowledged this Platonic desideratum, and responded by
adopting David Hume’s Verification Principle of empirical justification as the needed link for
knowledge; but the Gettier problem showed this account to be problematic. In response to this,
dubious attempts to remedy JTB Theory were offered, and many epistemologists even opted for
a shift towards externalist accounts of justification.
Alvin Plantinga was one such philosopher who argued for externalist Reliabilism, and
suggested that justification should be replaced with epistemic warrant. The epistemic status of
warrant is conferred on a belief if and only if one’s belief-forming faculties are aimed at truth,
and if they are functioning properly within a congenial environment that they are designed to
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function within. However, Linda Zagzebski argued that Plantinga’s account of warrant is just as
susceptible to the Gettier problem as JTB theories, and she therefore argued that the Gettier
problem is inescapable for both JTB Theory and Plantingian Reliabilism. Digging beneath the
surface, John Greco insisted that Gettier cases of epistemic luck unveiled deeper methodological
concerns with Gettier-era intuitionism, and these concerns led many epistemologists to shift the
paradigm altogether.
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2. The Virtues of Character and the Intellectual Virtues
This chapter will treat some of the fundamental concepts of virtue epistemology, and
close by offering a general model for it as a methodology. Given that virtue epistemology is
largely concerned with intellectual virtues, many prominent virtue epistemologists have drawn
parallels between epistemology and virtue ethics. There are different approaches to virtue ethics
in the broader Aristotelian tradition (i.e. eudaimonist virtue ethics, agent-based and exemplarist
virtue ethics, and target-centered virtue ethics), but there is a common Aristotelian thread that
runs through all of them pertaining to the basic nature of character virtues.91 That is, most virtue
ethicists will affirm that character virtues are excellences; that character virtues are involved with
human flourishing (eudaimonia); and that character virtues require practical wisdom
(phronesis).92
As it pertains to the ‘virtues’ of virtue epistemology, there are two categories of
intellectual or epistemic virtues that will be identified in this section: intellectual faculty virtues
and intellectual character virtues.93 The latter is an ancient and medieval concept that was
largely reconceptualized by Linda Zagzebski in her seminal work Virtues of the Mind. Chapter 2
will briefly examine character virtues in the Aristotelian tradition to serve as an effective
springboard into the concept of intellectual character virtues. The reason for this is to establish
a good framework from which to propose virtue epistemology as a paradigm shifting, postGettier approach to epistemology.
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Beginning in section 2.1, this chapter will start with an examination of Aristotle’s virtue
ethics proposed in his Nicomachean Ethics. Following this, section 2.2 will take a look at
Aristotle’s virtues of thought, where a definition of intellectual faculty virtues will be offered.
Once this has been accomplished, the chapter will turn to examine the concept of intellectual
character virtues. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a brief examination of virtue
epistemology in general. The ultimate reason for this is to provide a framework by which to
analyze intellectual humility and self-knowledge, where it will later be argued in Chapter 3 that
intellectual humility is necessary for self-knowledge.

2.1 Aristotle’s Account of the Character Virtues
It should come as no surprise that virtue has its western roots amongst the ancient Greeks,
given that the concept was largely used by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Generally speaking,
the Greek word for virtue is arete (ἀρετή), which can be translated as an “excellence.” As it
pertains to its broad use in the ancient Hellenized world, arete was used to denote an excellent
feature or function of something.94 As a few examples, the arete or virtue of a knife is its blade;
the blade is the excellent feature of the knife which allows it to serve its purpose, to cut well.
The arete or virtue of a runner is one’s legs; the legs are the excellent feature of a runner which
allows one to run, and to run well. The arete or virtue of the Cathedral Church of Saint Peter in
Exeter, England is its stone-vaulted ceiling; this medieval style ceiling is the longest of its kind

94
To be sure, the Socratic philosophers wrote in the attic Greek dialect common to the philosophers of Athens; this
dialect is to be distinguished from koine Greek, which was the common tongue dialect spoken throughout the
broader Hellenized world.

45

in the world (315 ft long), and it is certainly the most excellent and beautiful feature of the
Exeter Cathedral.95
For all intents and purposes, character virtue can be defined as an excellent dispositional
trait of a person that is conducive for flourishing.96 It is a character trait inasmuch as it is a deepseeded quality of one’s character, and it is a dispositional trait inasmuch as it facilitates habitual
tendencies or patterns of behavior. When examining the fountainhead source of western virtue
ethics— Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics—there are a handful of notable features of virtuous
character traits. 1. A character virtue is a mean between the two extremities of deficit and excess;
i.e. bravery is a mean between cowardice (deficit vice) and rashness (excessive vice).97 2.
Character virtues are voluntary and acquired through habituation.98 3. Character virtues are
praiseworthy.99 4. Character virtues are good inasmuch as they have eudaimonia as their telos.100
5. Lastly, character virtues are governed by practical wisdom (phronesis).101
When it comes to human nature, Aristotle believed that humans are not virtuous or
vicious by nature but rather, only have a natural capacity to become virtuous or vicious, implying
that moral development is the result of free agency.102 To put this differently, Aristotle believed
that humans have an innate capacity of sorts for rational character formation, which is a
volitional and integral part of being human. For this reason, he strongly emphasized the
necessity of implementing good habits into one’s life that are conducive for virtue acquisition
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and good character development.103 Furthermore, it is important to stress here that character
formation does not happen by fiat of the will, rather, virtuous character traits are slowly formed
by one’s exponentially acting in a virtue conducive manner over time; that is, one’s habitually
acting in such a way that is consistent with how a virtuous person would normally act. In other
words, good habits are the vehicle by which one develops virtuous dispositions for action.
It should be noted that there is a distinction between someone acting as if virtuous and
someone being virtuous.104 Being virtuous means that one is virtuous in character, and will
normally behave according to one’s good character. Someone who is not virtuous can still act as
if virtuous. Take for example someone who is not courageous but who commits an act of
courage. While the action might seem virtuous in and of itself, according to Aristotle someone’s
acting courageously does not necessarily entail that one is courageous.105 As a matter of fact, and
as noted above, acting as if virtuous is what largely makes virtue acquisition possible, for when
one habitually acts like a virtuous person, one can slowly become virtuous over time. All in all,
virtue acquisition is more complex than just being a good actor. Alongside acting like a virtuous
person, virtue acquisition in the Aristotelian tradition requires authentic change, emphasizing the
need for one to develop good habits and character dispositions. This also includes learning to
develop the right motivations and emotions, alongside one’s developing good moral
judgement.106
To illustrate this distinction between being virtuous and acting as if virtuous, a good
example can be found in Steven Spielberg’s classic war film “Saving Private Ryan.” In this
103
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critically appraised film, Corporal Timothy Upham—played by actor Jeremy Davies—serves his
American platoon as a German and French translator. When push comes to shove, there are
multiple scenes where the platoon feels that Upham’s timidity hinders the squad, and this
ultimately comes back to haunt them. There is a particular scene in the film where Upham’s
fellow brother in arms, Private Stanley Mellish—played by actor Adam Goldberg—finds himself
in a hand-to-hand deathmatch with an enemy German soldier. As this brutal deathmatch unfolds,
Upham is stationed outside the room where the fight is happening. As he hears the echoes and
screams of his friends dance with death from the nearby stairwell, he stands there, rifle in hand,
frozen by fear, doing nothing as his comrade is bested by a German foe. All that to say, when
his comrades needed him most, Upham’s character rose to the surface to reveal his deep
cowardice. To the viewing audiences surprise, Upham does have a stroke of glory and
redemption at the end of the film in a one-off stunt of bravery. However, this one-off stunt of
bravery hardly seems to imply that Corporal Upham was a courageous man on the battlefield.
No, while he acted with courage in one particular scenario, make no mistake that Upham is byand-large portrayed as a coward. The simple point to draw here is that one act of courage,
though possible, does not mean that someone is a courageous person, and the like holds for other
character virtues and vices.
Even if one is not familiar with Aristotle’s philosophy, there is an obvious distinction
between being virtuous and acting as if virtuous; the first is a state of being while the latter is a
kind of action. As stated above, it is possible for one to act as if virtuous while not being
virtuous, so long as one acts in a way that a virtuous person would normally act. In the case of
Corporal Timothy Upham, his one-off spout of courage at the end of the film was an action
inspired by the countless examples of bravery set forth by his courageous comrades. As a result,

48

he acted like a courageous person normally would because he had seen it done before, even
though he was not himself courageous. Given this distinction between being and action,
Aristotle suggests the following concerning genuine acts of virtue:
But for actions in accord with the virtues to be done temperately or justly it does not
suffice that they themselves have the right qualities. Rather, the agent must also be in the
right state of mind when he does them. First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous
actions]; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and, third,
he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state.107
This reference adds to the key distinction between acting as if virtuous and being virtuous. That
is, a genuinely virtuous person will not only be disposed to act virtuously, but will do so from a
firm and unchanging state, which entails that one has the appropriate feelings and reasons for
action that are relevant to a given character virtue. For example, a genuinely courageous person
will by default have an attitude of confidence in the face of fear; she will know that she is acting
courageously, and will do so from a firm state of character; she will be motivated by the
appropriate emotions (i.e. a righteous anger or benevolence); and she will choose to do so
because it is the right thing to do.

2.2 Aristotle’s Account of the Intellectual Virtues
While character virtues were defined above as excellent dispositional traits, Aristotle’s
concept of intellectual virtues is quite different. To prime this distinction, it will be important to
appeal to his basic understanding and division of the human soul. When it comes to souls,
Aristotle affirmed that plants, animals, and humans all have souls, and therefore have similar
soulish features or capacities. Aristotle believed that the ontological similarities amongst all
living beings begins with the most basic capacity or function of life (bios), e.g. the vegetative
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capacity for nourishment and growth. Furthermore, what distinguishes animals and humans
from plants, according to Aristotle, is a soulish capacity for animals and humans to perceive
suitable objects.108 Finally, the main distinction between animals and humans is that humans
have both mind (nous) and the capability to reason.109 Given these distinctions, Aristotle divides
the soul as follows (see Figure 1 below):

Figure 1

The left section of the Nonrational Soul entitled “Vegetative” denotes the capacity of the
soul to be nourished, as mentioned above. The right section of the Nonrational Soul entitled
“Desire (Orektikon)” indicates bodily appetites for action.110 Orektikon is derived from the Greek
word orexis, and it is used by Aristotle to denote a bodily capacity for desire, which is
fundamental to Aristotle’s philosophy of action. In essence, bodily desires play a fundamental
role in human action, and it is actions, as well as states of mind (i.e. attitudes), that character
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virtues are concerned with. Furthermore, Aristotle divides the rational soul into two parts (see
“Figure 1” above), he writes:
Let us call one of these the scientific part, and the other the rationally calculating part; for
deliberating is the same as rationally calculating, and no one deliberates about what
cannot be otherwise. Hence the rationally calculating part is one part of the part of the
soul that has reason.111
Aristotle calls these two rational parts of the soul “phronesis” and “sophia.” Very clearly,
Aristotle indicates that someone who possesses the virtues will be practically wise; that is, one
will be prudent (phronesis) in one’s deliberation or rational calculation.112 Additionally, one
who is virtuous in thought will be theoretically wise (sophia), and utilize theoretical wisdom for
knowledge of necessary truth.113
However, Aristotle would certainly not suggest that everyone is practically wise or
theoretically wise by nature; it is actually quite the opposite. Just as one is capable of becoming
virtuous, one has natural capacities for being practically and theoretically wise. To be sure, a
practically wise person will possess phronesis inasmuch as she knows how to act prudently when
the situation demands it. The rational state of phronesis serves as a sort of practical reason that
governs a virtuous person’s decision making, and this is why there is an arrow pointing from
phronesis towards orektikon (desire).
As it pertains to the human mind specifically, Aristotle affirmed that there are five virtues
or excellences of thought: Episteme (scientific knowledge), technē (craft knowledge), phrōnesis
(prudence or practical reason), sophia (wisdom or theoretical reason), and nous
(understanding).114 These virtues are quite distinct in nature from Aristotle’s main character
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virtues: bravery, temperance, generosity, and justice. Aristotle’s list of intellectual virtues are
not so much character traits as they are kinds of knowledge or cognitive faculties and capacities.
In short, Aristotle considers human understanding to be an excellent function of the rational soul
and mind which is capable of inductively grasping universals: the metaphysical first principles of
each science (i.e. the principles of causality in physics).115 Scientific knowledge (episteme) is
defined as a deductive logical demonstration of a given theoretical sciences first principles.116 It
is a knowledge of things which are necessary and everlasting; things which could not be
otherwise. On the contrary, craft knowledge is a kind of knowledge that is concerned with the
production of contingent things, i.e. things that could be otherwise. Aristotle draws multiple
distinctions between production and action, because ultimately production has its end in a
product, whereas action has its end in itself.117 Therefore, while both production and action both
require deliberation, production does not require prudence (phronesis). Both phronesis and
sophia will be defined momentarily, but it will be prudent to first define intellectual faculty
virtues.
While Aristotle’s virtues of thought are essentially different kinds of knowledge, as well
as excellent cognitive functions, what is meant by intellectual faculty virtues in the twenty-first
century has more to do with innate cognitive functions and abilities.118 For all intents and
purposes, an intellectual faculty virtue can be defined as an excellent and reliable cognitive
function or capacity that is innate to the mind. The commonly accepted faculties are perception,
introspection, understanding or rational intuition, reason, and memory.119 Furthermore, one
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might break these down into sub-faculties of sorts: Acute perceptivity of one or more of the
senses, comprehension, memorization and memory recollection, abstraction, imagination, etc.
Ernest Sosa notes that it is helpful to distinguish cognitive faculties into two categories:
generative faculties and transmission faculties. That is, sensory faculties such as sight and
hearing as well as rational intuition generate beliefs, while memory preserves and transmits
beliefs internally.120 Before moving to define intellectual character virtues, it will be important to
briefly treat phronesis and sophia, because deliberation over these two forms of wisdom have a
special place in the conceptual origination of intellectual character virtues.
Turning first to sophia, Aristotle defines it as the excellence of the scientific part of the
rational soul, which has an appetite for both human understanding and scientific knowledge (See
“Figure 1” above).121 By scientific, one must take into consideration that Aristotle means that
which is logically derived from metaphysical first principles. In essence, the faculty or function
of human understanding is tasked with grasping first principles, whereas Aristotle viewed
scientific knowledge as a logical demonstration of said first principles.122 The kind of ‘sciences’
that he seems to have in mind are logic, metaphysics, and mathematics. He goes on to add that
understanding and knowledge make up the concept of sophia because it has as its telos the most
honorable things of nature; that is, necessary truth and universals.123 In short, Aristotle defines
sophia as a virtuous state of the soul—a theoretical wisdom—and its primary function is to
govern the faculties of the human mind in the epistemic pursuit of science and first principles.
Turning now to phronesis, Aristotle clarifies that it is the virtue of the rationally
calculating part of the soul, which has an appetite for contingent things and not for the necessary
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truths of sophia. In essence, phronesis is an excellence of the rational part of the soul which has
an appetite for good action and the common practices of mankind, or that which is good for a
person; phronesis is concerned with contingent things, i.e. anything that could be otherwise.
Thus, phronesis is concerned with voluntary actions because they are contingent. Aristotle
writes: “The remaining possibility, then, is that prudence is a state of grasping the truth,
involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being.
For production has its end in something other than itself, but action does not, since its end is
acting well itself.”124 Prudence, then, for Aristotle, is a virtuous truth grabbing state of the
rational soul which has an appetite for the good, where the good comes from good actions arising
from virtuous character traits.125 In short, the key distinction that Aristotle draws between the
two is that phronesis is concerned with human action, deliberation of the good, and ultimately
human flourishing (eudaimonia), while sophia is concerned with scientific knowledge and
human understanding.126
To speak in plain language about these two virtues, it is much easier to conceptualize
prudence as practical reason, and wisdom as theoretical reason. In essence, Aristotle suggests
that someone who is flourishing needs to know how to act well in scenarios that require moral
deliberation or judgement. This much was made clear by point 5. in the list of key features of
Aristotle’s character virtues above, which suggested that character virtues are in accordance with
practical reason (phronesis). On a similar note, Aristotle emphasized that someone who pursues
mathematics, the sciences, and metaphysics needs to be taught how to excellently navigate these
disciplines with a theoretical kind of wisdom. Interestingly enough, and contrary to the
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obtainment of character virtues, Aristotle suggests both prudence and wisdom—as virtues of
thought—are obtained through being taught, and not through habituation. Nevertheless, while
both prudence and wisdom are obtained in similar fashion, there is a sharp contrast between their
respective applications: phronesis is concerned with character virtue, action, and knowledge of
particulars; while sophia is concerned with human understanding and scientific knowledge.127

2.3 Intellectual Character Virtues
In the contemporary era there has been a reconceptualization amongst some Aristotelian
thinkers concerning the sharp distinction between phronesis and sophia. In Linda Zagzebski’s
book Virtues of the Mind she articulates her dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s bifurcation of sophia
and phronesis, because such a bifurcation does not emphasize the kind of responsibility involved
in any pursuit of knowledge.128 Her project by and large aims to overlap these kinds of wisdom
so as to extend phronesis into the realm of theoretical contemplation and knowledge. In essence,
Zagzebski argues that there are forms of intellectual virtue that are character-based in nature.
What is more, these intellectual character virtues govern the practical use of one’s cognitive
faculties and are necessary for knowledge. One might say that there is a moral agent driving the
cognitive faculties of the mind, and because there is agency behind the machinations, practical
wisdom (phronesis) must extend into the territory of sophia. As it happens, where phronesis
extends, character virtues must be present in some way, shape, or form.129 Zagzebski writes:
“This should lead us to suspect that if Aristotle and Aquinas are right that practical wisdom is a
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necessary and sufficient condition for moral virtues, then practical wisdom is also a necessary
and sufficient condition for the intellectual virtues.”130
To better define intellectual character virtues, it will be prudent to recapture the definition
of intellectual faculty virtues for the sake of immediate contrast. On the one hand, an
intellectual faculty virtue is an excellent and reliable cognitive function or capacity that is
innate to the mind. On the other hand, an intellectual character virtue is an excellent
dispositional character trait of a person that’s purpose is epistemic in nature.131 This includes
the obtainment, retainment, and the transmission of knowledge. As it pertains to this kind of
intellectual virtue, philosopher W. Jay Wood writes:
Following the model of a moral virtue, we can analyze intellectual virtues as abiding,
reliable traits that allow us to orient our intellectual lives—our believings, perceiving,
reasoning habits, and so on—in ways that contribute to human flourishing. Intellectual
virtues, on this analysis, ought not to be equated with reliably functioning natural
faculties such as sight, hearing, memory or capacity for introspection, though the absence
of properly functioning natural capacities could very well interfere with my being able to
perceive, feel and act reliably as virtue might require.132
To be sure, here is a basic list of just a few noteworthy intellectual character virtues:
intellectual carefulness, studiousness, originality, intellectual accountability, intellectual
thoroughness, intellectual honesty and open-mindedness, intellectual courage, intellectual
perseverance, and intellectual humility. The virtue of intellectual humility will be treated at great
length shortly, but before turning to examine intellectual humility, it will be prudent to examine
virtue epistemology as an epistemological framework for the intellectual virtues.
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2.4 Virtue Epistemology
The aim of this section will be twofold. First, given that there are various approaches to
virtue epistemology, it will be important to identify some of the core and unifying features of the
methodology as a whole. After this, the two common approaches of Responsibilism and
Reliabilism will be defined.133 It is important to remember that the ultimate aim of this inquiry is
to investigate the virtue of intellectual humility, and not to evaluate the core themes of virtue
epistemology by and large; such an endeavor is well beyond the scope of this project.
Nevertheless, given that there has been a large shift over the past 25 years in epistemology
towards the social and normative dimensions of the field, an inquiry into intellectual humility
will indirectly prove to show some of the overall advantages of virtue epistemology as a postGettier approach.
The term arete or ‘excellence’ is a broad term, and this can make things difficult when
trying to get a grasp on virtue epistemology. There are many different intellectual excellences or
virtues that could prima facie be classified as an excellence or virtue of the mind. For the task at
hand, it will be helpful to keep in mind the two kinds of intellectual virtues defined in the
previous section to gain a rough understanding of virtue epistemology as an epistemic method
(i.e. intellectual traits and faculties). In every account of virtue epistemology, the intellectual
virtues serve as keystone pieces; their primary role serves as the universal thread amongst the
various approaches. Just to be sure, the primacy of the intellectual virtues naturally entails a few
methodological commonalities.134
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First and foremost, virtue epistemologists affirm that intellectual virtues are necessary for
knowledge and serve as an adequate means for answering skeptical challenges. While the
philosophical force of skepticism is viewed differently amongst virtue epistemologists, many
critical realists are not very concerned with skeptical arguments at all. Virtue epistemologist
Christopher Hookway suggests that responding to skepticism is potentially a mark of intellectual
incontinence inasmuch as it entertains problems that arise solely from unnecessary and
unrealistic spouts of reflection. In short, if epistemic inquiry involves experience, understanding,
reflection, and judgement, then entertaining skepticism to the nth degree irresponsibly gives an
undue amount of reflective attention to abstract and hypothetical challenges, which are largely
irrelevant outside of the guild or the study.135
As it pertains to the concept of knowledge, virtue epistemologists agree that knowledge
cannot be accidentally true belief, rather knowledge is a belief that is true because of one’s
intellectual virtue.136 In Virtues of the Mind Linda Zagzebski suggests that “knowledge is a state
of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue.”137 That is, true belief is necessarily bound
to one’s making cognitive contact with reality via an exercise of intellectual excellence.138 A
general definition could be put as follows: S knows that p if:
I.

S believes that p
II.

III.

p is true

True belief p is virtuously formed

Given that intellectual virtues are necessary for knowledge, most virtue epistemologists
draw parallels to virtue ethics, suggesting that intellectual virtues lead to an excellent and
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successful thought life; a life of intellectual flourishing. In order to intellectually flourish, one
needs to form true beliefs in a virtuous way, which emphasizes the importance of one’s being or
becoming an intellectually virtuous person.139 For example, someone who is intellectually
thorough—specifically when crafting an essay—will be disposed to be clear and concise in her
writing, and will thus, by default, seek to apportion the appropriate amount of relevant content
into her essay in order to succeed. Furthermore, her epistemic pursuits will demand the
employment of her faculty virtues, i.e. good comprehension or reasoning skills, trained eyesight;
or perhaps she will employ her imagination in a powerful and colorful manner, so as to enhance
the thoroughness and clarity of her insights.
Some virtue epistemologists who are reliabilists have continued to engage with Gettierera problems (e.g. John Greco). As was seen in Chapter 1, all sorts of skeptical wrenches and
cases were tossed at the epistemic concepts of knowledge and justified belief. The general
response to the Gettier problem from a virtue epistemologist is that S does not know that p
because S did not form true belief p at time t with one’s virtues.140 While Alvin Goldman and
Ernest Sosa had a secondary interest in intellectual virtues during the Gettier era, the
distinguishing mark of virtue epistemology is the primary role that virtues play in explaining the
concept of knowledge. What is more, some virtue epistemologists (reliabilists) affirm that
justified belief is ultimately reducible to the intellectual virtues. This implies that what is
commonly meant by ‘justified’ is a term that applies directly to a particular agent’s intellectual
character, as opposed to a property of some epistemic method, piece of evidence, or internal
feature of one’s conscious.141
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Given that intellectual character traits play a primary role in virtue epistemology, there
are inevitably normative implications here. To emphasize this, Christopher Hookway makes a
distinction between what he calls static and dynamic forms of epistemic evaluation. Static
epistemic evaluation tends to focus on particular states of mind such as knowledge or justified
belief, while dynamic evaluation focuses on goal-oriented activities such as inquiry or
deliberation, which are epistemic in nature. Given that there are all sorts of epistemic activities
one engages in (i.e. reflection, observation, studying, etc.), should not epistemologists discuss
how one ought to go about these activities?142 The general point to draw from Hookway is that
constraining epistemology to only static forms of evaluation neglects normative epistemological
endeavors such as inquiry and deliberation, which are fundamental to intellectual flourishing.
Another normative concern has to do with epistemic desert-based claims. One might ask:
Does one deserve to be praised for one’s true beliefs that are virtuously formed? As it pertains to
this particular issue, John Greco has developed the concept of “credit” for knowledge, which
serves as an epistemic parallel to moral praiseworthiness for virtuous actions.143 That is, if one
has knowledge then one deserves to be given credit. He writes:
But one of the central functions of knowledge attributions is to give credit for true belief.
When we say that S knows that p, we imply that this is not just an accident that S believes
the truth with respect to p. On the contrary, we mean to say that S gets things right with
respect to p because S has reasoned in an appropriate way, or perceived things accurately,
or remembered things well, etc. We mean to say that getting it right can be put down to
S’s own abilities, rather than to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else.144
Greco’s credit theory is a good bridge into the notion of epistemic value. Virtue epistemologists
are collectively interested in the value problem of knowledge, and therefore want to give an
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adequate account of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This is a problem
that dates back to the ancient world, and has roots in Plato’s Meno.145
Greco believes that a parallel to Aristotle’s virtue ethics is telling of the value of
knowledge. The reader might recall Aristotle’s distinction between acting as if virtuous and
acting virtuously, which suggested that an act of virtue must come from a firm and unchanging
state.146 Greco notes that this kind of action for Aristotle is both intrinsically valuable and
ultimately conducive to eudaimonia. He therefore suggests that true belief and knowledge are an
epistemic parallel to acting as if virtuous and acting virtuously, inasmuch as knowledge comes
from a firm and unchanging intellectual state. That is, forming true beliefs via one’s intellectual
virtues is more valuable than obtaining a true belief by chance or happenstance because it has
both instrumental and inherent epistemic value.147

2.4.1 Reliabilism and Responsibilism
To echo the point made at the beginning of this section, given that the term arete is used
broadly, there are many different approaches to virtue epistemology. Many of these approaches
are concerned with the skeptical challenges postulated by Descartes and Hume, while some
radical approaches view responding to skepticism as taking the bait, and playing the skeptics
games. Nevertheless, there are two particular strands of virtue epistemology that represent more
moderate engagements with modern philosophy: Responsibilism and Reliabilism. As a brief
word, it is important to recognize that the field at large values both categories of intellectual
virtues. While the two accounts below differ in priority over intellectual traits and faculties, a
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synthetic approach is more representative of the present state of the field. That is, the virtues
tend to generally complement one another, and there is no need for strong methodological
divisions concerning one class of intellectual virtues over another.
Reliabilism as an approach to virtue epistemology gives priority to faculty virtues, which
are virtuous precisely because they are successful in achieving the general goal of obtaining
more true beliefs than false beliefs. Alvin Plantinga’s reliability component of epistemic warrant
was introduced in Chapter 1, which serves as a good framework for reliabilism here. To be sure,
while Plantinga’s contributions can be viewed as stages in its evolution, virtue epistemology as a
form of reliabilism is largely derivative of the more recent works of Ernest Sosa, the founder of
this general approach. For Sosa, the kinds of virtues that he has in mind are the intellectual
faculty virtues defined in the previous section. He stresses that the excellence of a faculty virtue
lies precisely in its overall reliability to lead one to it its proper end, where its proper end is one’s
being in a proper relation to the truth.148 That is, the excellence of a cognitive faculty virtue is its
reliability to secure one’s having a surplus of true beliefs over false beliefs.149 For example, the
excellence of memory is its reliability to store and transmit true beliefs, and this much is clear
when one recalls to mind something one knows but does not have in mind at a particular moment
in time.
Responsibilism is an approach to virtue epistemology that originates from the works of
philosopher Lorraine Code. Contrary to Reliabilism, responsibilists stress the primacy of
intellectual character virtues for knowledge; Code particularly views epistemic responsibility to
be the virtuous core of the epistemic life.150 To become intellectually responsible as an inquirer,
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one must have an openness to truth and a willingness to self-reflect in order to obtain selfknowledge and insight into the state of one’s character.151 What is more, the responsibilist will
recognize that one’s context and broader epistemic community plays an essential role in the
obtainment, retention, and transmission of knowledge.152 Humans are social creatures by nature,
and if one looks, for example, at the modern educational system, one will notice that it is built
around intellectual communities that value expertise and epistemic collaboration. If an
intellectual community is not collectively responsible, then they are capable of obstructing
intellectual flourishing at a corporate level, and this emphasizes the need for communal
epistemic virtues (i.e. honest public discourse, diversity, standards of academic honesty, etc.).
Code writes:
This is an approach which denies the autonomy of the known, and insists upon the
epistemological significance of the nature of the knower, and of his/her environment and
epistemic community. These require elaboration as enabling and/or constraining factors
in the growth of knowledge as such, both for the individual and the community. And it is
here that a “thickly” descriptive account is the only kind that will do.153
In short, Responsibilism as an approach to virtue epistemology gives priority to intellectual
character virtues, which are excellent inasmuch they lead to responsible habits and patterns that
are knowledge-conducive for both the individual and the broader epistemic community.
It is important to clarify that prioritizing intellectual traits does not necessarily make one
a responsibilist. There is a bit of a radical twist to virtue epistemology that is gaining traction
amongst those who value intellectual character traits. Philosophers by the likes of Linda
Zagzebski, Christopher Hookway, Robert C. Roberts, and W. Jay Wood seem to be moving in
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this direction.154 Furthermore, philosophers of this approach tend to stress that the idea of a
‘faculty-virtue’ distorts the concept of an intellectual virtue altogether, and should not be
categorized in the same vein; this much was made clear in Wood’s definition of intellectual
virtues offered in the previous section.155 As it pertains to a more radical approach, moral
philosopher David Solomon suggests that “It would not be belief-based; it would be agent—or
end—based in that virtue would be more basic than belief. It would focus on the cognitive life
of the agent rather than on episodes of cognitive activity in isolation.”156

Chapter 2 Summary
Virtue epistemology was introduced in this chapter as a popular alternative to JTB
Theory. The reason for having done this is because the main argument in Chapter 3 will operate
under the general framework of virtue epistemology. In order to better understand virtue
epistemology as an option, Aristotle’s concept of a character virtue was examined in section 2.1.
Virtue epistemologists commonly draw parallels between virtue ethics and epistemology, and
have thus conceptualized intellectual character virtues to be structurally similar to Aristotle’s
model of a character virtue in Nicomachean Ethics. In section 2.3, an intellectual character
virtue was defined as an excellent dispositional character trait of a person that’s purpose is
epistemic in nature. This was contrasted alongside the concept of an intellectual faculty virtue,
which was treated in section 2.2, and was defined as an excellent and reliable cognitive function
or capacity that is innate to the mind. The key motivation behind introducing these concepts
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was to establish a conceptual framework for the virtue of intellectual humility, which was
classified as an intellectual character virtue.
This chapter concluded with a broad examination of virtue epistemology. The central
thread of all virtue epistemology accounts is the primary role that the intellectual virtues have in
each account. Reliabilism and Responsibilism were introduced as two common accounts of
virtue epistemology, and it was noted that their main difference is between which kind of
intellectual virtue plays a more integral role for knowledge: faculties or intellectual character
traits. While both kinds of virtues are valued, many epistemologists argue that calling an
intellectual faculty a ‘virtue’ is a misunderstanding of terms. It was shown in section 2.3 that W.
Jay Wood does not view the intellectual faculties as virtues per say, and therefore they should
not be equated with intellectual virtues. While these epistemological issues are still ongoing, it is
important to note that many virtue epistemologists do not want to be constrained by modern
epistemological concepts. Some radical epistemologists desire to see the field become an
entirely normative discipline, where analyzing mental states is of secondary interest, if not
decentralized altogether.
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3. Intellectual Humility and Self-Knowledge
To begin this final chapter, it is helpful to ask: Why do humble people seem to have selfknowledge? The answer that will be entertained here is that an intellectually humble person has
dispositions that are conducive for honest and realistic self-reflection, which leads one to accept
and own one’s cognitive limitations. Given that there are many natural obstacles to selfknowledge—as Kant suggested—intellectual humility plays a necessary role in tackling some of
the greatest obstacles. In light of the many challenges that obstruct self-knowledge, the thesis
statement that will be argued here is that: Intellectual humility is necessary for self-knowledge
of one’s character because this kind of self-knowledge requires critical self-reflection
There are all sorts of western adages that talk about the ‘blinding’ nature of pride as a
vice. This common notion has carried into the discussion of intellectual humility where
intellectual forms of pride obstruct epistemic goods such as knowledge, justified belief,
knowledge transmission, rationality, epistemic collaboration, and communal flourishing. But the
recent literature only presupposes the historic correlation between intellectual humility and selfknowledge. Why is this? One answer could be that self-knowledge accounts have not caught up
with the revival of Aristotelian philosophy. One such philosopher at the forefront of this issue is
Quassim Cassam. This chapter will very briefly introduce some of his basic ideas about selfknowledge offered in his book self-knowledge for humans.
This chapter will begin in section 3.1 by examining two leading accounts of intellectual
humility: the Limitations-owning account and the Low-concern account. Following this, section
3.2 will take a look at some of the social benefits of intellectual humility, where the work of John
Greco will be introduced. Section 3.3 will introduce Quassim Cassam’s basic idea that
substantial self-knowledge has a bit of a high entry fee. There will be a distinction between
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Cassam’s notion of trivial and substantial self-knowledge, as well as a brief highlight of some of
the common challenges to self-knowledge espoused by Cassam. In section 3.4 the main
argument will commence. In this section two notorious challenges to self-knowledge will come
into focus: The problem of fantastical self-conception, and the problem of blameworthy selfignorance. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a few important clarifications in section 3.5.

3.1 Two Leading Accounts of Intellectual Humility
The Limitations-owning account proposed by Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason
Baehr, and Daniel Howard Snyder essentially affirms that the intellectually humble person is
attentive to and owns one’s intellectual limitations. They write:
Limitations‐Owning. IH consists in proper attentiveness to, and owning of, one's
intellectual limitations. So much for what IH is. Why suppose it is ever a virtue?
Arguably, for a character trait to be a virtue, the motivations that underlie it must make its
possessor good as a person. We won't attempt to determine which motivations make one
a morally good person, but we think that appropriately desiring epistemic goods such as
truth, knowledge, and understanding makes one an intellectually good person, whether or
not it makes one a morally good person. So we propose that IH is an intellectual virtue
just when one is appropriately attentive to, and owns, one's intellectual limitations
because one is appropriately motivated to pursue epistemic goods, e.g. truth, knowledge,
and understanding.157
This account very basically suggests that intellectual humility consists of a host of behavioral,
cognitive, motivational, and affective dispositions that lead one to take an appropriate stance
towards one’s intellectual strengths.158 Furthermore, it also consists in a similar set of
dispositions that lead one to own one’s strengths. That is, when the intellectually humble person
is in a position where she needs to be attentive to her strengths, she is disposed to both be aware
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of her strengths, and to own them. The like holds for intellectual weaknesses.159 The pressing
point is that the Limitations-owning account paints a picture of a humble person as being
someone that has substantial self-knowledge of one’s own intellectual abilities and weaknesses,
and therefore would value the intellectual strengths of others.160 As it pertains to self-knowledge,
a person with Limitations-owning dispositions will be willing to engage in critical self-reflection,
and will be willing to accept the reality of oneself even if it is less than ideal.
The Low-concern account of intellectual humility proposed by Robert C. Roberts and W.
Jay Wood views humility as a broad virtue, because its counter-vice pride takes a plethora of
different forms. This position is more Augustinian in nature given that humility serves as a
negation to pride, and because there is not an account of humility in excess (i.e. servility).161
Roberts and Wood are particularly interested in three forms of intellectual pride: vanity,
arrogance, and dominance. Vanity is more or less defined as a disposition to excessively admire
one’s own achievements while also having a strong desire to be praised by others.162 Arrogance
is defined as a disposition to think, act, and feel in a way that stems from unwarranted
entitlement claims.163 Lastly, dominance is defined as a disposition to control and dominate both
others and situations.164 Humility, then, serves as one or more dispositional traits that counteracts
prideful traits. Roberts and Wood define intellectual humility as follows:
What, then, is intellectual humility? The foregoing analysis suggests it is an unusually
low dispositional concern for the kind of status that accrues to persons who are viewed by
their intellectual communities as intellectually talented, accomplished, and skilled,
especially where such concern is muted or sidelined by intrinsic intellectual concerns—in
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particular the concern for knowledge with its various attributes of truth, justification,
warrant, coherence, precision, and significance. It is also a very low concern for
intellectual domination in the form of leaving the stamp of one’s mind on disciples, one’s
field, and future intellectual generations. As the opposite of intellectual arrogance,
humility is a disposition not to make unwarranted intellectual entitlement claims on the
basis of one’s (supposed) superiority or excellence.165
The gist of the Low-concern account is that epistemic humility serves as a virtuous trait which
constitutes a host of dispositions that serve to negate various forms of intellectual pride, where
the most common forms of intellectual pride are vanity, dominance, and arrogance. These forms
of pride are more basically connected with egotistical and narcissistic self-conceptions. In the
academy, Woods and Robert argue that the intellectually humble academic is not primarily
interested in the status or accolades that come with success, but in the general pursuit of
epistemic goods. The kind of goods that Roberts and Wood would have in mind are things such
as rationality, knowledge, justification, insight, and intellectual flourishing within an epistemic
community.166
3.2 The Social Benefits of Intellectual Humility
Intellectual humility has gained a lot attention for its social benefits. It is relatively clear
that some epistemic goods are attainable at a communal level if a community collectively values
the aforementioned characteristics of intellectual humility. One of the central epistemic norms
connected with intellectual humility is a collective reliance on reliable testimony as an excellent
vehicle for knowledge transmission. As it happens, the entire academic world is structured
around experts, libraries, classrooms, and conferences. The academy as a whole revolves around
expertise and well researched literature, as well as different forms of epistemic collaboration.
But none of these are possible without a collective reliance on reliable testimony. That is, the
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basic structure of the academy is built around epistemic social interdependency; an ancient
vision that is well reflected in Socratic midwifery and Hebraic discipleship. If one visited the
famous Library of Alexandria in the ancient world where scrolls were read out loud, the halls
would have rung with the curious inflexions of individuals who were studiously dependent on
others for insight. While the structure of the academy is an ancient and medieval vision, the
modern operation of the academy has drifted away from intellectual interdependency towards
modern forms of individualism.
John Greco believes that epistemic individualism is largely the result of modern forms of
internalist and externalist accounts of testimony, and thus it takes intellectual humility to
recognize the general interdependency of peers within an epistemic community. As it pertains to
justification within testimonial accounts of knowledge transmission, he identifies evidentialism
as a common form of externalist justification. Evidentialism places the receiving agent of a
testimonial source in a central and autonomous role during knowledge transmission.167 That is,
the reader or listener plays the role of a receptionist who autonomously validates—evidentially—
whether or not the source or testifier is trustworthy, and whether or not she will use the content
of the testimony within her own epistemic pursuits. There is a twofold examination happening
here: The receiving agent judges whether or not the distribution source is evidentially grounded,
and also judges whether or not the content of the testimony is justified based on whether or not it
is grounded in factual evidence. Greco writes: “The facts about the individuals evidence
determine the facts about the individual’s epistemic status (of one sort or another).”168 I.e. the
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receiving agent’s factual evidence is what confers the epistemic status of ‘justified’ or
‘warranted.’
Alongside evidentialism, individualism also includes forms of internalist accounts in
which one is justified—in regards to some testimonial datum—by some occurrent factor within
the agent’s mind that supervenes on one’s conscious; some of these accounts are strikingly
reminiscent of Kant’s transcendental project, given that Kant was an internalist.169 As it pertains
to internalism, Greco writes: “The facts about an individual’s epistemic status (of one sort or
another) supervene on facts that are ‘internal’ to the individual.”170 That is, internal factors of the
receiving agents mind are solely what justify the incoming testimony.
Epistemic justification of these two kinds—really just JTB externalism and internalism in
relation to testimony—are classified as a kind of epistemic individualism by Greco, which is now
being countered by forms of anti-individualism given the social and normative implications of
intellectual humility. Roughly speaking, on individualist grounds, whether external or internal,
justification solely depends on an individual’s ability to autonomously validate what is being
testified to. On the contrary, anti-individualism accounts of testimony suggests that the agent
testifying plays a more direct and prominent role in the transmission process than individualist
accounts presume, given that the listener/reader does not merely believe the testifier but trusts
the testifier.171 But trust does not come without a set of epistemic norms that foster and govern a
responsible and trustworthy epistemic community. There needs to be a set of governing
epistemic guidelines and norms to ensure that trust and communal interdependence serve as a
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reliable and effective norm within the community (i.e. academic peer reviews, librarians,
thorough publishing guidelines, qualified speakers, etc.).
The essence of Greco’s position is that intellectual humility, within an epistemic
community, fosters a reliable and trustworthy communal environment that holistically, and
externally, justifies its members. The community overall creates an environment where
cognitive faculties can function with excellence, and where intercommunal relationships are
sensitive and safe, making it possible for its members to intellectually depend on one another
regularly.172 Such a community helps to counteract prideful forms of vanity given that its
members regularly defer to one another on matters of expertise and have norms that contribute to
corporate intellectual flourishing. In short, Greco’s general argument is that externalist warrant
ought to extend into one’s epistemic community where the environment plays a significant role
in knowledge, and where intellectual humility as a social norm and ideal enhances the
flourishing of the community as a whole.
If one harnesses insights from both the Limitations-owning account and Greco’s social
view, the intellectually humble person is portrayed as someone who will not only own her
strengths, but who will also be aware of the strengths of her peers and of her general dependency
on her broader epistemic community. Thus, she will prudently own her intellectual limitations
whenever the situation warrants it (i.e. defer to a colleague or a written source, admit when
something is beyond her training, etc.). Furthermore, the humble person will do so with an
attitude that is appropriate to humility, i.e. she will not do so begrudgingly. It is helpful to call to
mind Aristotle’s idea of friendship here, where he notes that a good person takes pleasure in the
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excellent actions of a friend. An intellectually humble person will value the brilliance and
excellence of a friend or epistemic peer given that humble people are generally other-centered.173

3.3 Substantial Self-knowledge
Since Descartes’s famous cogito statement, philosophers have predominately been
interested in metacognition accounts of self-knowledge stemming from the modern notion of the
private inner sense. In other words, philosophers have been interested in the implications of the
human capacity to analyze propositional attitudes from the vantage point of the inner sense,
given that it provides an exclusive perspective that is inaccessible to others. This perspective
grants authority to the individual because of one’s exclusive vantage point.174 One might say
that the inner sense affords a kind of first-person epistemic awareness of one’s own mental states
that is privately confined to the agents own consciousness.
Descartes cogito provided a level of direct awareness of thought from which an agent
could not be wrong about one’s own mind, and this is typically referred to as strong
foundationalism. For example, how could one ever be in a position to authoritatively tell another
person that they are not in pain, or that they do not have a certain desire for something? Kant, on
the other hand, believed that it was impossible to view oneself in an objective sense, as Descartes
suggested. Thus, self-awareness is an indirect phenomenon that somewhat parallels Kant’s own
understanding of the a priori categories of pure reason. Coming off of the tail end of nearly half
a millennium of Cartesian, Lockean, and Kantian accounts of self-knowledge has left behind the
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ancient and medieval vision of a virtuous thought life. While cogito accounts of self-knowledge
are remarkably fascinating, self-knowledge for the Socratics played a more substantive and
practical role in leading to a virtuous life in general.
As it pertains to self-knowledge, it is fair to suggest that the propositional content of a
belief is what largely dictates its value. As an example, I know that I believe myself to be
wearing a blue cardigan right now, and I also know that I believe there is a computer directly in
front of me that I am currently typing on. In short, my knowing a belief of mine indicates that I
have self-knowledge about my own belief-states or propositional attitudes. While these
examples of self-knowledge might prove to be useful at times, this kind of propositional content
does very little in the way of contributing to human flourishing.175 On the other hand, if I were
to say that I know that I have a tendency to routinely sleep past my alarm, then I demonstrate
insight into a behavioral tendency of mine that could be indicative of a character vice. Selfknowledge about vices is valuable if one wants to take proactive steps to change. As another
example, if one has irrational fears that contribute to unhealthy episodes of obsessive anxiety,
then having knowledge of one’s own irrationality could be the first step in developing effective
coping mechanisms. These examples are vastly more valuable in nature, given that the
propositional content is of things that threaten human flourishing.
The simple point is that self-knowledge of one’s character traits, emotions, strengths, and
desires plays a much more substantial role in human flourishing. As it pertains to selfknowledge of one’s character, Aristotle thought it was necessary to have insight into one’s
motivations for action in order to determine the quality of one’s character. If one’s overall
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attitude is in harmony with one’s good actions, and if this harmony reflects how one usually acts
and feels in similar scenarios, then this is indicative of character virtue. Learning how to
examine one’s own attitudes and motivations is crucial for determining whether or not one
possesses a specific virtue or vice, and this kind of self-knowledge is fundamental to human
flourishing and character development.
As it pertains to knowledge of one’s own mental states, such as knowledge concerning
one’s beliefs or propositional attitudes, it seems intuitively obvious that the propositional content
of a belief largely dictates its practical value. To be sure, knowing that I believe that I am
wearing a blue cardigan seems rather trivial or unimportant, but when compared to my knowing
that I believe that I love my wife, there is no question that this kind of belief is substantially more
valuable than the former. The reason is simple: The latter belief leads me to know why I act
lovingly towards my wife, and this self-knowledge gives me insight into how I can enhance our
marriage. Knowing that I love my wife can lead me to further act in ways that are conducive to
our mutual flourishing; to internalize obligations that are necessary for a healthy relationship.
When challenges in our marriage make it difficult to act lovingly, having self-knowledge of my
love for her helps me to scrape up the motivation to continue acting in a loving manner. From
this awareness I can learn to develop and maintain patterns of behavior that maximize our
flourishing as a couple, even when it is tough.
While both of these examples of self-knowledge represent particular beliefs of mine, the
propositional content of the beliefs examined largely determines their worth. As such, one might
draw a distinction between what Quassim Cassam calls trivial self-knowledge and substantial
self-knowledge.176 These two kinds of knowledge both technically count as self-knowledge, but
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just to be sure, their respective content largely dictates their value.177 What is more, there is not a
staunch categorical distinction between these two kinds of self-knowledge, rather the
propositional content is either more substantial or trivial in nature, admitting a mere difference in
gradation or degree. It should be noted that Cassam’s account is different from Kant’s account
of substantial self-knowledge briefly alluded to in the Introduction. What Cassam has in mind
seems to be indicative of what Kant meant by derivative self-knowledge: knowledge that is
particular to the self-inquiring agent.
On the one hand, trivial self-knowledge is concerned with knowledge that is of little
value or consequence, such as my knowing that I believe that I am wearing a blue cardigan. On
the other hand, substantial self-knowledge is knowledge of things that are significantly more
important to an agents overall flourishing, such as knowledge of one’s own values, desires,
emotions, and character traits.178 Given that knowledge of one’s character traits is included as a
form of substantial self-knowledge, Cassam stresses that the higher end of the trivial/substantial
spectrum naturally begins to include knowledge of things that are more ontologically basic than
mere trivial mental states.179 Once more, trivial self-knowledge examines mental states that do
not have any practical value, while substantial self-knowledge goes beyond this to examine
things that are more ontologically basic and integral to human flourishing, such as one’s
character and personality traits.
To briefly revisit the idea of a gradual difference between trivial and substantial selfknowledge, Cassam offers a set of general conditions that are indicative of one’s having
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substantial self-knowledge; the more conditions one meets, the more substantial one’s selfknowledge is.180 To be sure, these are not as much formal conditions as they are suggestive costs
and features of substantial self-knowledge. While Cassam’s list will not be examined in its
entirety, there are a few particular conditions that will be helpful to briefly examine for the sake
of the current inquiry.
The first is The Fallibility Condition. This condition largely indicates that one’s beliefs
about oneself are susceptible to fallibility.181 For example, many will argue that humans are
capable of being self-deceptive.182 Even if one is presented with strong evidence that one’s
character is vicious, humans maintain a natural tendency to view themselves in a positive
light.183 Nevertheless, if one thinks that one has substantial self-knowledge, one is always
susceptible to self-deception given the complex dynamics of self-hood.184 On this note, selfdeception serves as a good bridge into the next condition, The Obstacle Condition. The crux of
this condition is that there are common obstructions that keep one from obtaining selfknowledge. For example, when a close friend or family member offers negative feedback about
some character flaw that one has—maybe said person dominates conversations—the gut
response is often to go on the defensive as a means of resisting negative feedback.185
Another noteworthy condition is The Self-Conception Condition. The general idea here
is that self-knowledge must carefully navigate the complexities of one’s own self-conception.186
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Self-conceptions are often opaque given that they are enmeshed with one’s passions and morals;
often times self-judgements are the product of hazy intuitions connected to one’s deepest desires
and ideals, making it hard to distinguish who one really is from who one aspires to be. The crux
of this condition is that human self-conception often misses the mark. That is, humans are
capable of self-conceiving in a way that is conceitful or bashful; put another way, one is capable
of either undervaluing or overvaluing oneself. What is more, some obstacles to accurate selfconception are not volitional at all.
The final condition to mention is The Corrigibility Condition. This condition more or
less affirms that self-knowledge ought to be constantly open to reform given that one is often not
the best authority over oneself. As it happens, another person might have a better understanding
of your own character than you do.187 It is often said that when taking a personality test it is
helpful to have a spouse or close friend take the test on your behalf. This emphasizes the
corrigibility condition, given that others are often in a better position to speak insight into your
character traits or behavioral patterns than you are. What is more, humans are not static agents,
but dynamic agents that are constantly changing and developing overtime. Therefore, one’s
basic overall epistemic posture should be open to truth, given the inherent dynamics of selfhood.
As a brief conclusion for this section, here is a compact and succinct synthesis of these
conditions. The beliefs one has about oneself are prone to fallibility given their close
relationship to one’s self-conception, and the complex nature of self-conception often obstructs
self-knowledge. Furthermore, given that humans are dynamic agents that change overtime, selfknowledge is corrigible, which demands an overall epistemic posture that is conducive for selfknowledge in the face of change. In the next section, two specific problems will be identified
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that require intellectual humility for self-knowledge: fantastical self-conception and
blameworthy self-ignorance.

3.4 Intellectual Humility as Necessary for Self-Knowledge
In this final section it will be argued that intellectual humility is necessary for obtaining
substantial self-knowledge because self-knowledge requires critical forms of self-reflection.188
Critical self-reflection is a virtuous means of obtaining self-knowledge which involves the
intellectual virtues of honesty, humility, carefulness, and sometimes courage. In the interest of
self-knowledge, there are at least two normal obstacles that all humans face: wishful selfconception and self-ignorance.189 These challenges are not inherently bad, but they do serve as
natural inlets for pride, therefore the intellectually responsible agent will recognize these things,
and will recognize the necessity of critical self-reflection for self-knowledge. The virtuous life
in general requires intellectual humility because a virtuous person needs to critically examine
oneself often in order to properly obtain self-knowledge of one’s character, which is necessary
for character development.
While self-conceptualization and self-ignorance are normal phenomenon, the former is
largely what makes pride possible in the first place. But regardless of whether or not one is
prideful, these obstacles highlight the imperfection of human self-awareness in general. Thus,
the Limitations-owning account flexes its muscles here, given that the humble person will
critically self-reflect because one’s basic self-understanding is naturally prone to being
compromised. For this reason, the Low-concern account is particularly advantageous for
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substantial self-knowledge because it offers an account of humble dispositions that are consistent
with how a virtuous person would usually self-reflect, just as the very idea of becoming virtuous
presupposes vice and imperfection.190 Low-concern dispositions are also at play here because
humility disposes one to be disinterested in grandiose idealization, something that is often
lacking in arrogant and vain individuals.
3.4.1 Fantastical Self-Conception
Arrogant and vain people just seem to have a dodgy relationship with their limitations,
given that they often seem to have self-concepts that are out of touch with reality. In some cases,
arrogant self-estimation is just an exaggeration of oneself, but in more serious cases intellectual
arrogance can be altogether self-deceiving. As just mentioned, arrogant and vain individuals
often have a self-concept that more or less reflects an ideal self rather than a real self, where the
beliefs one has about oneself are loosely grounding in reality. In The Sickness Unto Death
Kierkegaard speaks to this phenomenon and suggests that there needs to be a balance between
the possible self and the real self. He writes:
Surely what the self now lacks is actuality; that at least is what would normally be said,
and indeed we imply this when we talk of a person’s having become unreal. But on
closer examination what the self really lacks is necessity. For it is not the case, as the
philosophers would explain it, that necessity is a unity of possibility and actuality; no,
actuality is the unity of possibility and necessity. Nor is it merely lack of strength that
makes a self lose itself in possibility, at least not as usually understood. What is really
missing is the strength to obey, to yield to the necessary in one’s self, what might be
called one’s limits. Nor therefore is it the misfortune of such a self not to have become
anything in the world; no, the misfortune is that he did not become aware of himself, that
the self he is is a quite definite something, and thus the necessary. Instead, through this
self’s fantastically reflecting itself in possibility, he lost himself. Even to see oneself in a
mirror one must recognize oneself, for unless one does that, one does not see oneself,
only a human being. But the mirror of possibility is no ordinary mirror; it must be used
with the utmost caution. For in this case the mirror is, in the highest sense, a false one.
190
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The fact that in the possibility of itself a self appears in such and such a guise is only a
half-truth; for in the possibility of itself the self is still far from, or only half of, itself.191
The general point that Kierkegaard is raising here is that humans can often get lost in the fantasy
of possible selves. One might call this the problem of fantastical self-conception. The human
imagination plays a vital role in the development of a person, just as one is capable of imagining
a manifold of possible realities that could obtain. But it is idealistic and possibly even vicious to
get too lost—like Don Quixote—in the manifold of possible selves that could obtain, whereas
some human desires altogether lack any necessity or grounding in the limitations of one’s own
reality.192 Critical self-reflection serves as a constant ego-check against fantastical selfconception, where many individuals are altogether ignorant of the arrogant or unrealistic selfconcepts they have. It takes humility to get back down to earth; to meet reality on realities terms.
One might consider the foothold that wishful thinking and pride gains through the faculty
of memory recollection as an example of this. There are certainly times when memory
recollection of past experiences are not always clear representations of the past, making wiggle
room for exaggeration and sensationalized story telling. Neuroscience studies have shown that
retrieved memories return to the memory bank with modifications.193 In other words, retrievable
memories become distorted the more they are accessed, making them less reliable. Psychiatrist
Dr. Bessel Van Der Kolk writes:
As long as a memory is inaccessible, the mind is unable to change it. But as soon as a
story starts being told, particularly if it is told repeatedly, it changes—the act of telling
itself changes the tale. The mind cannot help but make meaning out of what it knows,
and the meaning we make of our lives changes how and what we remember.194
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To add to what Dr. Van Der Kolk is saying, the more that a particular memory is retrieved the
more susceptible it becomes to distortion and possibly even misuse in the hands of an egotistical
person. While less than accurate story telling is often times the harmless byproduct of an
imperfect testimony from memory, the vain person may use this as an opportunity to impress
others with tall tales that are dishonest and exaggerative. If someone tends to retrospectively
sensationalize one’s past experiences in order to make oneself out to be more than one truly was
(i.e. someone who excessively relives the good old days), then low concern dispositions for
status could promote more honest reflections that neutralize exaggerative tendencies spurred on
by less than accurate memory recollection. Someone who is intellectually humble and who has a
general awareness of the fogginess of commonly accessed memories will usually recognize the
limitations of memory recollection, and will have a willingness to own their own shortcomings
as it pertains to this faculty. What is more, the intellectually humble person may even suspend
judgment on hazy past selves altogether, or might seek further insight from another source, if
possible, to supplement one’s deficiency.

3.4.2 Blameworthy Self-Ignorance
Another problem is that humans are often self-ignorant towards their vices. As it
pertains to self-ignorance, a pressing point that Cassam raises is that some vices fly under the
radar and are notoriously difficult to detect. Cassam calls theses vices stealthy vices.195
Alongside the fact that general self-concepts are susceptible to error, which can often be tied to
different forms of pride, it is important for a virtuous person to critically self-reflect because one
might be altogether self-ignorant of some character vice one has. Cassam insists that stealthy
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vices often have intellectual dispositions that obstruct the agent from self-knowledge of its very
existence in the first place, hence pride is often referred to as ‘blinding’
The pressing question to ask is whether or not self-ignorance of a character vice is
something that is blameworthy? To continue with arrogance as an example, is it right to blame
an arrogant person for their lack of insight into the very fact that they are arrogant? Cassam
says yes, and he notes that it is possible for self-ignorance to be blameworthy if one has been
presented with suitable evidence that one possesses a particular vice.196 He further argues that
stealthy vices are partially debilitating for good character formation because they obstruct selfknowledge, whereby self-knowledge is the key to vice management and good character
development.197 The implication here is that self-knowledge has practical value because one
needs to be aware of one’s vices if one wants to develop good character.198 As the Socratic
proverb suggests: ‘To know thyself is the beginning of wisdom.’
What Cassam ultimately suggests is that critical reflection requires a host of intellectual
virtues because stealthy vices are not self-intimating.199 Intellectual arrogance is a common
stealthy vice that obstructs critical self-reflection; therefore, intellectual humility is needed for
self-knowledge in the case of intellectual arrogance. Cassam writes:
A willingness to engage in self-criticism requires epistemic humility and openness.
Epistemic vices are epistemic deficits, and being open to the possibility that one has such
deficits is a form of epistemic humility, that is, ‘attentiveness to one’s own cognitive
limitations and deficits.’ Such attentiveness is clearly needed for critical reflection on
one’s epistemic vices.200
He goes on:
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The epistemic vices that are contrary to epistemic humility are arrogance, vanity, and
hubris. It is possible to be arrogant and humble about different things, and it is even
possible to be arrogant and humble about the same thing, as when one is in two minds
about it. However, a person who is intellectually arrogant is unlikely to be seriously
attentive to his cognitive deficits and limitations since he may well think he doesn’t have
any serious deficits or limitations. By the same token he is unlikely to have much interest
in the project of reflecting on his limitations and deficits, even though regarding oneself
as intellectually superior to other people isn’t strictly speaking incompatible with
recognizing that one is vice-free. A person with an intellectual superiority complex can
acknowledge that he is far from perfect, but his cognitive imperfections are likely to
strike him as less important and less worthy of serious critical reflection than would be
the case if he didn’t have the sense of himself as special.201
The main point is that the ethical life requires a willingness to admit that one might be vicious in
some way, shape, or form given the hiddenness of certain vices. The ethical or virtuous life
requires responsible and critical self-inquiry. This kind of self-reflection requires intellectual
humility, which is an essential virtue of critical self-reflection; and critical self-reflection is the
means of obtaining substantial self-knowledge of character, given the two obstacles to selfknowledge just identified (e.g. fantastical self-conception and self-ignorance).
A common form of intellectual arrogance is an unwillingness to self-reflect, which is
motivated by overconfidence and cognitive bias. Cassam notes that intellectual arrogance often
leads to self-ignorance of one’s own incompetence, which is a kind of intellectual version of the
Dunning-Kruger effect, whereby incompetent and arrogant individuals often lack the skills and
abilities needed to know that one is incompetent via a superior cognitive self-bias.202 Cassam
insists that sneaky vices demand thorough and honest epistemic investigation given their
blinding nature, and this is where intellectual humility enters the picture. Because humans are
both imperfect in self-conception, and are capable of forming sneaky vices, virtuous people must
critically self-reflect often in order to stay grounded.
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In Either/Or Kierkegaard emphasizes that the ethical life demands mediated forms of
self-reflection in order to realize the moral capacities of the self. At the most basic level of
human existence is the aesthetic mode of being: a life of immediacy, emotion, and pleasure.
Kierkegaard suggests that the aesthetic man is not a full self because he is merely shaped by his
external environment and appetites, and therefore lacks any deeper and reflexive understanding
of himself.203 However, the ethical life denotes a life of reflection by which one internalizes
societal obligations and norms, whereby one realizes a more concrete self that is not lost to the
every changing tides of externality. Kierkegaard’s ‘Judge Wilhelm’ in Either/Or insists that one
who internalizes universal duties into one’s physical being creates a bridge between the
particular and universal modes of human being, whereby this internal synthesis of the aesthetic
and ethical modes gives birth to true individuality; an individuality that is continuous through
time and change. Kierkegaard writes:
Now let us compare an ethical and an aesthetic individual. The main difference, on
which everything turns, is that the ethical individual is transparent to himself and does
not live ‘out in the blue’ as does the aesthetic individual. From this difference everything
else follows. The person who lives ethically has seen himself, knows himself, permeates
his whole concretion with his consciousness, does not allow vague thoughts to fuss
around in him, nor tempting possibilities to distract him with their legerdemain; he
himself is not like a witch’s letter which, depending on how you turn the pages, give you
first this image, then that. He knows himself. The expression gnothi seauton is repeated
often enough and one has seen in it the aim of all human striving. Quite right, too, but it
is equally certain that it cannot be the goal unless at the same time it is the beginning.
The ethical individual knows himself, but this knowledge is not mere contemplation, for
then the individual would be specified in respect of his necessity; it is a reflection on
himself, which is itself an action, and that is why I have been careful to use the
expression ‘to choose oneself’ instead of ‘to know oneself’. In knowing himself the
individual is not complete; on the contrary, this knowledge is highly productive and from
it emerges the true individual.204
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To know oneself is to know that one is meant for more than an epicurean life of pleasure and
immediacy; self-knowledge is the beginning of the ethical life because it is through selfknowledge that one realizes the moral capacities of human agency. To be an authentic individual
is to have equilibrium between the aesthetic and the ethical; to choose to have one’s foot in both
camps simultaneously.205 The arrogant person lacks self-insight because he lacks the intellectual
humility needed for critical self-reflection, which is necessary for an ethical life. Thus, an
arrogant person who is self-ignorant to one’s own arrogance runs the risk of an altogether
‘aesthetic’ mode of being, whereby the agent misses the ethical life, because he altogether lacks
the desire to critically self-reflect on his own shortcomings and limitations. To be sure, the
aesthetic individual may be self-ignorant to his blinding vices, but because he never cares to stop
to reflect on the nature of himself in a deeper way, he never truly come to know himself at a
deeper level.

3.5 Closing Clarifications
This chapter will close with a few clarifications. The first clarification is that it is not
being insisted that all forms of self-knowledge require intellectual humility. For example, if
someone is angry, it does not always require intellectual humility to know that one is angry.
Simple introspection may do. Nevertheless, there are certainly circumstances where knowledge
of emotional states are difficult to come by. For example, it usually takes intellectual humility to
admit—or even realize—that one has certain fears that are undesirable. The general argument
presented in this chapter is that intellectual humility plays a necessary role in critical self-
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reflection, but not that it is necessary for every kind of self-knowledge. Given that humans are
prone to fantastical self-conception and blameworthy self-ignorance, critical self-reflection is a
necessary endeavor for a virtuous life. Thus, intellectual humility is necessary in order to
uncover vices such as intellectual arrogance, but it is not always needed to have knowledge of
one’s own emotions or belief states.
The second clarification is that self-ignorance is not always a bad thing. There are all
sorts of things about oneself that one is typically self-ignorant about. While self-ignorance of a
vice might be blameworthy if one has reasonable evidence to believe that one has a particular
sneaky vice such as intellectual arrogance, there are plenty of other forms of self-ignorance that
are both natural and maybe even good.206 For example, the psyche of some early childhood
trauma victims often times involuntarily represses bad memories as a defense mechanism. But
this kind of ignorance is not blameworthy at all given that the victim has no say in the matter.
The point raised in this section is about blameworthy self-ignorance.
Furthermore, this is also why Kierkegaard’s aesthetic and ethical categories were brought
into the discussion, because given the problem of fantastical self-conception, ethical selfconception demands critical self-reflection. What is more, the fact that one is often inaccurate in
self-conception, and the fact the one is certainly self-ignorant in some ways, merely emphasizes
some of the cognitive limitations that all humans have. Again, this goes back to Kierkegaard’s
point that humans need to be in touch with their limitations. The intellectually humble person
will own these limitations when applicable because these limitations are universal to all humans.
The third clarification is that it is perfectly plausible for a blameworthy self-ignorant
individual to obtain insight into their viciousness. The notion that pride is a ‘blinding’ vice is a
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proverb not a promise. Aristotle’s distinction in Chapter 2 between acting as if virtuous and
being virtuous is a crucial point to raise here, because if a vicious individual was incapable of
obtaining self-knowledge of one’s vice, then character development is non-volitional. The
clarification is that someone who is not intellectually humble can still obtain self-knowledge.
For example, an intellectually arrogant person could act as if intellectually humble and obtain
self-insight, even though said person is not disposed to do so, because dispositions do not
necessarily determine action. Otherwise the common phrase ‘he acted of character’ would be
nonsense. The distinction between being virtuous and acting as if virtuous holds in the
intellectual realm.
To continue with this notion, a common expression that one often hears is: ‘That was a
humbling experience.’ Arrogant people are often exposed to their arrogance through failure,
given that their overconfidence often times falls short of what they believe themselves to be
capable of. Sometimes ‘humbling’ moments are catalysts for acts of intellectual humility, by
which an arrogant person might open oneself up to honest and humble self-reflection. The
trickiest part for the arrogant person will be to own or accept the reality of oneself, should one
obtain self-insight into one’s own arrogance. But to insist that one needs to possess the character
trait of intellectual humility to have self-knowledge would be a very strong condition. In short,
the view espoused here is that it takes an act of intellectual humility to obtain substantial selfknowledge in many cases where prideful vices are sneaky. Fortunately, the intellectually humble
person is disposed to act humbly, and therefore critical self-reflection should be a fairly routine
and common process for said individual.
The final clarification is that not everyone is virtuous. Being intellectually humble
presupposes that one is virtuous in some way, shape, or form. Some people gain insight into
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their character and have no interest in changing whatsoever. For example, someone who knows
oneself to be arrogant but does not care to change is insouciant, while someone who knows
oneself to be vicious in a way that hurts other people is malevolent. What’s more, some people
altogether operate under a moral framework that recognizes humility as a vicious trait. Friedrich
Nietzsche famously attacked humility as being a cowardly and spurious virtue. He viewed
humility as the virtue that suppresses blessed vanity, by which right reason restrains the natural
will to power and dominance.207
To echo the Kantian notion, to know oneself is to know that one is human, and to be
human is to be imperfect and dependent on others. To believe otherwise is intellectually
arrogant. Keeping this in mind, humility is one of the virtues by which humans collectively
realize an altruistic common good. But just to be sure, it is not out of the question to suggest that
prideful or vicious individuals could both have self-knowledge and be fully complicit with their
viciousness. Those who genuinely want to dominate others may well have self-knowledge that
they are maliciously dominant while not giving a care in the world, and they may even view this
as a good thing. But what remains to be seen is whether or not they genuinely understand what it
means to be human. In the most inhumane cases of malevolent dominance, it is not out of the
question to suggest that a malevolently domineering person might have self-knowledge and just
relish the evil. But what remains to be seen is whether or not they are blinded by a deeper, and
more sinister sneaky vice; a vice that conceals a misunderstanding not of their own character, but
of what it means to be human in general. To borrow the language of Kierkegaard, there is a level
of inhumanity that is indicative of one’s being a half-self, hence the term inhumane.
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Chapter 3 Summary
In summary, the thesis statement was presented and argued in this final chapter, which
insists that intellectual humility is necessary for self-knowledge of one’s character because this
kind of self-knowledge requires critical self-reflection. To argue this point, two accounts of
intellectual humility were introduced in section 3.1 to provide a thorough definitional basis: e.g.
the Low-concern and Limitations-owning accounts of intellectual humility. These accounts
together offered a good understanding of what intellectual humility is, and they were both
frequently alluded to as the thesis was argued throughout the final chapter. Alongside these two
accounts, the social benefits of intellectual humility were briefly explored in section 3.2. The
social dimensions of intellectual humility are important because classic accounts of moral
humility often paint the humble person as being other centered; the same is true for intellectual
humility, because the intellectually humble person will recognize one’s dependency on others for
epistemic goods. What is more, intellectual humility as a common social ideal within an
epistemic community helps to realize an interdependent and selfless community.
In section 3.3 Quassim Cassam’s basic idea of substantial and trivial self-knowledge was
introduced. It was argued that substantial self-knowledge of certain propositional beliefs has
more practical value than trivial beliefs. Given that some beliefs are more valuable than others,
substantial self-knowledge is often more difficult to obtain because it faces many natural and
nurtured challenges. However, there is a point where some natural challenges become problems,
because they provide avenues for different forms of intellectual pride. In light of this, the two
specific problems that were identified in section 3.4 are the problems of fantastical selfconception and blameworthy self-ignorance. Given that all humans are inevitably prone to
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these problems, it was argued that critical self-reflection is needed for self-knowledge, because
intellectual humility plays a necessary role in critical self-reflection.
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Conclusion
The ultimate purpose of this project was to demonstrate with clarity the intimate and
unique relationship between intellectual humility and self-knowledge. Humility is a very special
virtue given that its application extends into both the moral and epistemological realms of human
life. What is more, the shift towards virtue epistemology has fostered an entirely different
epistemological framework by which to examine humility’s pertinence for self-knowledge with
newfound power and clarity. While this statement might seem hyperbolic, when one considers
the constraints that were placed on humility by Aquinas, this fresh epistemic perspective
unbounds the true power of humility as the key virtue by which one comes to ethically know
thyself. Over the past decade intellectual humility has been lavished with philosophical
treatment and research-based initiatives, but its most fundamental application remains somewhat
untapped by the surge of Aristotelian and Thomistic thinkers that have turned their attention
towards it. This statement is by no means meant to serve as a criticism against the thinkers that
have treated this virtue, but as a catalyst to begin to further examine the rich connection between
self-knowledge and intellectual humility.
While the main aim of this thesis was to argue that intellectual humility is necessary for
self-knowledge, there are many different avenues that were left untraveled throughout this
project. Intellectual humility serves as a kind of touchpoint between the moral and the epistemic
worlds given that it is one of the keys to substantial self-knowledge, and presumably the good
life. Perhaps the biggest questions that remain to be answered are questions about human
flourishing in general, both at an intellectual and moral level. Quite simply, it goes back to the
ancient question: What is the good life, and what end does intellectual humility promote?
Alongside humility, it remains to be seen what sort of role the other intellectual virtues such as
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honesty or intellectual courage play in self-knowledge accounts within a virtue epistemology
framework. But given the rich history that humility has amongst the works of some of the
greatest thinkers across the course of human history, it is safe to assume that there are plenty of
exciting avenues that are still unexplored, especially when considering the fresh epistemic lens
that humility is now being given.
One emerging challenge to self-knowledge is the extension of the human ego across
social media and virtual reality platforms. That is, there is an ever-growing demand for selfprojection into the online universe. Humans are crafting and creating all sorts of versions of
themselves across the virtual world, and virtual self-projection often forces the individual to selfreflect in order to self-project. As the wheels of industry press forward to generate new avenues
by which the individual can project oneself across various social media services, the human ego
will continue to face new challenges never before encountered in human history. Ethical selfinquiry is not only needed for a virtuous life in physical reality, but for responsible and honest
self-projection into the world of virtual reality.
In an age where online video creators have more influence than major newspapers, there
is every need for humble self-projection given the weighty influence that these creators have
over the minds of the western world. The reason is simple: Many of these ‘content creators’ set
the precedent for what young minds consider to be the good life, and if someone’s self-projection
is dishonest and downright unrealistic, then their young followers inadvertently begin to form
ideals that are fantastical and unobtainable. In essence, Kierkegaard’s vision of the aesthetic life
becomes all the more possible, given the manifold of platforms and applications by which one
can virtually extend some version of their self. In other words, the ego is no longer confined to
the physical, because the ego can be projected into a virtual world of limitless possibility.
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The relevance of the Greek proverb gnothi seauton is more significant at this moment in
time than it ever has been, and by extension, so is intellectual humility. In a world of seemingly
limitless possibility, despair and anxiety are felt more rampantly than ever because reality is
often an afterthought, given that reality hinders the creativity and authority that one rightfully has
over one’s own self-projection into the virtual world. In the Kantian and Kierkegaardian spirit of
self-knowledge, the thing that is lacking most at this point it time is self-knowledge of one’s own
limitations; there is a wholesale dismissal of the real world for virtual forms of escapism, where
the bindings and limitations of the human self are replaced by the boundless nature of the virtual
avatar. Western forms of escapism and virtual reality have made Kant’s vision of substantial
self-knowledge more difficult than ever to obtain, because the real world is boring, unpleasant,
and unbecoming. Moving forward, intellectual humility will continue to be ever more relevant
for the world, because it takes humility to accept human reality, and to prioritize the real world
over the limitless forms of aesthetic self-projection that are possible.
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